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CONGRESS AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS: DEALING WITH
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION POST-AMERICOLD
S.I. Strong*
Abstract
Commercial trusts are one of the United States’ most important types
of business organizations, holding trillions of dollars of assets and
operating nationally and internationally as a “mirror image” of the
corporation. However, commercial trusts remain underappreciated and
undertheorized in comparison to corporations, often as a result of the
popular but mistaken belief that commercial trusts are analogous to
traditional intergenerational trusts or that corporations reflect the primary
or paradigmatic form of business association.
The treatment of commercial trusts reached its nadir in early 2016,
when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc. that the citizenship of a commercial trust should be equated
with that of its shareholder-beneficiaries for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the sheer number of shareholderbeneficiaries in most commercial trusts (often amounting to hundreds if
not thousands of individuals) typically precludes the parties’ ability to
establish complete diversity and thus eliminates the possibility of federal
jurisdiction over most commercial trust disputes. As a result, virtually all
commercial trust disputes will now be heard in state court, despite their
complexity, their impact on matters of national public policy, and their
effect on the domestic and global economies.
Americold will also result in differential treatment of commercial
trusts and corporations for purposes of federal jurisdiction, even though
courts and commentators have long recognized the functional
equivalence of the two types of business associations. Furthermore, as
this research shows, there is no theoretical justification for this type of
unequal treatment.
This Article therefore suggests, as a normative proposition, that
Congress override Americold and provide commercial trusts with access
to federal courts in a manner similar to that enjoyed by corporations. This
recommendation is the result of a rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of
both the jurisprudential and practical problems created by Americold as a
matter of trust law, procedural law, and the law of incorporated and
unincorporated business associations. This Article identifies two possible
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Congressional responses to Americold, one involving reliance on
minimal diversity, as in cases falling under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and
1369, and the other involving a statutory definition of the citizenship of
commercial trusts similar to that used for corporations under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c). In so doing, this Article hopes to place commercial trusts and
corporations on an equal footing and avoid the numerous negative
externalities generated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold.
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Over the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a number
of decisions seeking to clarify diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts,
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particularly with respect to commercial organizations.1 While these cases
have not achieved the level of notoriety associated with the Court’s recent
jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction,2 rules on diversity jurisdiction
have a significant and potentially outcome-determinative effect on
commercial litigation in the United States.3 When considered on a
cumulative basis, the Court’s decisions on diversity jurisdiction have a
meaningful impact on the U.S. economy as a whole.4
Nowhere is this phenomenon more clearly illustrated than in the
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc.,5 which considered the citizenship of commercial trusts for
the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.6 Commercial trusts are an oftenoverlooked but extremely important type of business organization that
1. See, e.g., Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1014 (2016)
(considering citizenship of commercial trusts); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010)
(describing a corporation’s principle place of business pursuant to the “nerve center” test);
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306 (2006) (determining the citizenship of a federally
chartered national bank for diversity purposes); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., 541 U.S.
567, 568 (2004) (considering whether a post-filing change in citizenship and status of both limited
and general partners’ citizenship should be considered in determining a partnership’s citizenship
in a diversity case); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990) (reaffirming the rule
that the citizenship of all members of a partnership must be considered in determining whether
complete diversity exists).
2. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct.
746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011); Judy M. Cornett & Michael H.
Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 107 (2015); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 125, 188 (2013); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1413 (2015); Zoe Niesel, Daimler and the
Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82 TENN. L. REV. 833, 837 (2015); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 611 (2015); Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1304–05
(2014); Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (2015).
3. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581,
607 (1998) (comparing outcomes in state and federal court). But see Debra Lyn Bassett, The
Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 140–41 (2003) (challenging
empirical studies regarding the perceived superiority of federal court); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1847–48 (2008) (discussing the role of diversity jurisdiction in case
outcomes).
4. See Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 451 (2003); William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in
Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 (1922).
5. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
6. Id. at 1014.
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operate as a functional equivalent to corporations7 and “dominate certain
types of modern business and financial transactions.”8 These types of
trusts bear little resemblance to traditional intergenerational trusts (i.e.,
those meant to pass on personal wealth after death) and play a central role
in the U.S. economy, holding trillions of dollars’ worth of assets and
generating billions of dollars’ worth of annual income, with
administrators and trustees earning similarly massive amounts in fees
each year.9
Americold held that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, commercial
trusts are to be considered citizens of any state where their beneficiaries
may be found.10 The problem is that commercial trusts can have hundreds
if not hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries spread throughout the fifty
United States and indeed throughout the world.11 In many cases, it is not
possible for commercial trusts to determine the citizenship and domicile
of their beneficiaries.12 As a result, it will be difficult if not impossible
for many commercial trusts to establish complete diversity as a matter of

7. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (stating that the classification of an
entity is not essential to determine its powers); Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A
Comparative Analysis of Canadian and American Uniform Legislation, 36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443, 451
(2011) (explaining that the trust was displaced by the corporation only when incorporation
become more accessible); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations:
Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 560 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts as
“Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31 (2005).
8. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 559; see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:
The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1997).
9. See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1027, 1070 (2012); Langbein, supra note 8, at 178 (estimating in 1994 that commercial
trusts held assets in the range of $11.6 trillion, with non-commercial trusts holding an additional
$672 billion in assets, conservatively estimated). There does not appear to be any comprehensive
data on the amount of money currently held by commercial trusts, although Professor Robert
Sitkoff is in the process of compiling this information. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The American
Statutory Business Trust: A Research Agenda, in THE REGULATION OF WEALTH MANAGEMENT 17,
29 (Hans Tjio ed., 2008). Some sector-specific information exists. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
10. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
11. See Ryan A. Christy, Redefining the Juridical Person: Examining the Business Trust
and Other Unincorporated Associations for Citizenship Purposes, 6 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 137, 151
(2004). For example, one publicly traded commercial trust that operates nationwide has over 96
million shares of common stock. See CIM Commercial Trust Announces Preliminary Results of
Tender Offer, BUS. WIRE (June 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20160614005650/en/CIM-Commercial-Trust-Announces-Preliminary-Results-Tender; see
also infra Subsection I.B.2.
12. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016; see also Thomas E. Rutledge & Christopher E. Schaefer,
The Trust as an Entity and Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Navarro Applicable to the Modern Business
Trust?, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 83, 104 (2013) (explaining that trusts used in complex
financial structures may lack information as to the citizenship of their beneficial owners).
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law.13 Indeed, this phenomenon has already occurred as part of the postAmericold reality.14
Because most trusts, including commercial trusts, are governed by
state rather than federal law, these types of disputes will now be heard
almost exclusively in state court.15 This is an outcome that has been
considered problematic not only in cases involving corporations16 but
also in other types of matters involving “national problems that happen
to be governed by state law.”17 Indeed, numerous authorities—including
the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, and Congress—have
routinely recognized the significant benefits that are associated with
federal jurisdiction.18 A special Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue
convened by the Judicial Conference in 1951 to consider corporate
citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction specifically noted that
“to close the doors of the national tribunals to organized business seems
to the Committee to be a bad policy that would create far more evil than
it would cure.”19
The situation is exacerbated by the international nature of many
commercial trusts, since the rule on alienage jurisdiction20 means that
13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605 (3d ed.
2015); Charles J. Cooper & Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Complete Diversity and the Closing of the
Federal Courts, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 300 (2014) (stating the requirement for
complete diversity is that the citizenship of every plaintiff be different from every defendant).
14. See RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2016)
(involving a pension trust); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcon. Realty Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3:14cv-3565-BN, 2016 WL 3570648, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2016) (involving a securitization trust).
15. See Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa O. Habbart, The Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act:
A Review, 65 BUS. LAW. 1055, 1055 (2010).
16. Concerns about state jurisdiction over corporate matters led to the creation of a special
rule regarding diversity jurisdiction for corporations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012); see also
infra notes 385–402 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)).
17. Diane P. Wood, The Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 593,
605 (2009).
18. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85 (2010) (providing for a court free of
local prejudice); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102;
see also 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3116–20 (reproducing the 1951 Report of the Committee on
Jurisdiction and Venue to the Judicial Conference, which identified various problems with state
courts).
19. 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3119.
20. Although most authorities consider alienage jurisdiction (which involves “citizens of a
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”) as identical to diversity jurisdiction (which
involves “citizens of different States”), there are some significant differences. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Walter C. Hutchens, Alienage Jurisdiction and
the Problem of Stateless Corporations: What Is a Foreign State for Purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2)?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1067, 1072 (1998) (emphasizing that “[n]ot only do diversity
and alienage jurisdiction apply to different types of parties, they are also founded on different
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U.S. citizens domiciled abroad are considered “foreign aliens” who are
“stateless” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).21 As a result, a commercial trust
will be unable to establish diversity jurisdiction if even one of its
beneficiaries is a U.S. citizen residing abroad,22 something that is
becoming increasingly likely in the modern world.23 Indeed, as Professor
Peter Oh has recognized, the rise of globalization and the concomitant
increase in the use of commercial trusts has made “the problem of
statelessness . . . not only real, but potentially ubiquitous.”24
Similar problems occur in cases involving corporations that are
incorporated outside the United States and have their primary place of
business in the United States,25 which suggests that commercial trusts
formed in offshore jurisdictions (again, an increasingly likely
possibility)26 will experience problems with U.S. federal jurisdiction as
rationales”); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 4 (1996) (noting the “academic preoccupation” with diversity jurisdiction and highlighting the
dearth of attention given to alienage jurisdiction).
21. See Oh, supra note 4, at 466. Professor Peter Oh suggests circumventing this problem
by “accord[ing] jurisdictional citizenship to foreign aliens based on their domicile.” Id. at 461.
22. See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (noting that one of the parties
must be a U.S. citizen in order for federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction); Gall v. Topcall
Int’l, No. Civ. A. 04-CV-432, 2005 WL 664502, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2005) (discussing the
historical interpretation of alienage jurisdiction); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3604
(discussing diversity jurisdiction in suits with citizens or subjects of foreign states as parties).
23. See Joe Costanzo & Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Counting the Uncountable:
POL’Y
INST.
(May
17,
2013),
Overseas
Americans,
MIGRATION
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/counting-uncountable-overseas-americans (noting the
difficulty in estimating American expatriates and placing the number between 2.2 million and 6.8
million); Lyman Stone, In an Age of Global Citizenship, American Expatriates Increase,
FEDERALIST (May 4, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/04/in-an-age-of-global-citizenshipamerican-expatriates-increase/ (estimating approximately thirteen million Americans born abroad
as of 2013, excluding military and diplomatic personnel, long-term tourists and temporary
workers).
24. Oh, supra note 4, at 459; see also id. at 450–51 (discussing the interaction between
alienage jurisdiction and international commercial interests).
25. See Hutchens, supra note 20, at 1073; David A. Greher, Note, The Application of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to Alien Corporations: A Dual Citizenship Analysis, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 233,
233–34 (1995).
26. While this Article will not discuss commercial trusts outside the United States in detail,
they are growing in importance. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law:
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 466–69 (1998); Norman
P. Ho, A Tale of Two Cities: Business Trust Listings and Capital Markets in Singapore and Hong
Kong, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 311, 314 (2012) (noting rise of business trusts in Japan, Korea,
Singapore, and Hong Kong as well as in continental Europe); Miller, supra note 7, at 444
(comparing commercial trusts in the U.S. and Canada); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts
as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 322
(2003); Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 47–48.
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well. As a result, commercial trusts are caught between a rock (in some
cases, the Rock of Gibraltar) and a hard place.
Matters relating to the citizenship of a commercial trust are not merely
academic. Instead, the question of where a business entity can expect to
sue or be sued is often critical to its operational decisions.27 Indeed, in its
“Doing Business” guides to international commerce, the World Bank
always “measures the presence of rules that . . . minimize the cost of
resolving disputes, increase the predictability of economic interactions
and provide contractual partners with core protections against abuse,”
three criteria that are often associated with distinctions between U.S. state
and federal courts.28 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold is
relevant not only to commercial actors in the United States but also to
foreign parties considering whether to do business with and in the United
States.29
Although Americold is consistent with the Court’s recent efforts to
limit federal subject matter jurisdiction,30 the decision is at odds with
Congress’s longstanding desire to protect diversity jurisdiction in cases
involving complex multijurisdictional disputes that are prone to error and
bias if heard in state court.31 This policy is particularly well-established
in matters involving corporations.32 Given the intricate, (inter)national
nature of contemporary commercial trust disputes as well as the extensive
similarities between commercial trusts and corporations, it appears
appropriate if not necessary for Congress to override the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Americold so as to avoid injury to individual and institutional
interests as well as to the U.S. economy as a whole.33 This Article

27. See Oh, supra note 4, at 465.
28. WORLD BANK, ABOUT DOING BUSINESS 19 (2016), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160430093742/http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Docume
nts/Annual-Reports/English/DB16-Chapters/DB16-About-Doing-Business.pdf; see also infra
Section III.A (regarding the theoretical justifications for diversity jurisdiction).
29. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016).
Foreign entities or U.S. entities operating abroad are subject to relatively complex and often
counterintuitive rules on citizenship. See Geraldine Soat Brown, When Is a Foreigner Diverse?
Diversity Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Foreign Citizens and Businesses, 62 FED. LAW.,
Jan./Feb. 2015, at 66, 66–70.
30. See Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 300–04 (discussing various ways that federal
courts interpret and apply rules regarding complete diversity so as to restrict access to federal
courts).
31. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605; see infra notes 363–91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Interpleader Act; the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction
Act (also known as the mass-disaster act); and the Class Action Fairness Act).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
33. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
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therefore recommends legislative action, consistent with the Court’s
invitation to Congress in Americold.34
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the problem by
outlining the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold and providing a
brief introduction to commercial trusts, including the differences between
commercial and non-commercial trusts as well as the various types of
commercial trusts. This discussion demonstrates the widespread negative
effect that Americold will have on individuals and institutions as well as
the U.S. economy as a whole.
Part II compares commercial trusts and corporations on both a
practical and theoretical level and considers whether and to what extent
the two types of business organizations can and should be considered
analogous for purposes of federal jurisdiction. The procedural analysis
becomes more targeted in Part III, which focuses specifically on diversity
jurisdiction and commercial trusts. After describing why commercial
trusts meet the theoretical rationales for diversity jurisdiction, the
discussion identifies a number of practical concerns arising out of the rule
in Americold, focusing in particular on commercial actors’ anticipated
efforts to exit the existing dispute resolution regime through arbitration,
forum selection clauses, choice of law provisions, place of organization
and choice of business form. Each of these alternatives carries a number
of risks and negative externalities that Congress may wish to avoid.
Next, Part IV provides a detailed analysis of two possible
Congressional responses to Americold. One option involves enacting
legislation that would extend the rule on corporate citizenship to
commercial trusts.35 In many ways, this appears to be the preferred
solution, since it respects the functional and theoretical similarities
between corporations and commercial trusts and offers the lower courts
a simple and thus predictable rule to follow.36 Another option involves an
exception to the rule requiring complete diversity, similar to that
established by Congress in other contexts.37 Although this approach
might require more detailed legislative drafting, it might reflect the
34. See id. at 1017. Empirical studies suggest that Congress is highly likely to act if the
Supreme Court makes such an invitation. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1332 fig.1 (2014).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
36. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (noting that “[s]imple jurisdictional
rules . . . promote greater predictability”); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting
functional equivalence of two business forms); Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note
7, at 31.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also infra notes 363–91 (discussing complete diversity
and the Interpleader Act; the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act; and the Class Action
Fairness Act).
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preferred policy objective (i.e., minimal diversity rather than complete
diversity based on the statutory citizenship of a commercial trust).38 After
considering these proposals, the Conclusion ties together the various
strands of argument to conclude the Article.
Before beginning, it is important to note that this Article focuses
exclusively on commercial trusts, which were the type of entity at issue
in Americold.39 Although some or all of the arguments contained herein
may be equally applicable to other types of business organizations (such
as partnerships, limited liability companies, benefit corporations and the
like), those entities are subject to their own unique jurisprudence and are
therefore beyond the scope of the current discussion.40 However, the
widespread support for legislative reform regarding jurisdictional
treatment of other types of unincorporated business organizations,
including a recent resolution from the American Bar Association in that
regard, suggests that the proposals contained herein are both timely and
well within the mainstream of American jurisprudence.41
It should also be noted that some courts have criticized Congress’s
failure to address problems relating to the citizenship of unincorporated
38. See infra Part IV (discussing possible statutory approach).
39. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014.
40. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 85; see also Michael E. Chaplin,
Resolving the Principal Place of Business Conundrum: Adopting a Single Test for Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 REV. LITIG. 75, 98–99 (2010) (discussing questions of corporate
citizenship after Hertz); Debra R. Cohen, Limited Liability Company Citizenship: Reconsidering
an Illogical and Inconsistent Choice, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 269, 272–73 (2006) (arguing that limited
liability companies should follow the statutory rule of “entity citizenship” similar to corporations,
which can be at most a citizen of two states (the state of creation and its principal place of business)
rather than the common law rule of “aggregate citizenship,” which looks through the
organizational form to its individual owners, as in cases involving partnerships); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 827, 829–30 (2005); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business
Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1996). “Benefit corporations” are a new type
of business organization that may or may not fall within the statutory exception to complete
diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A
Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 592 (2011) (describing benefit
corporations as a “hybrid organizational form”). Compare Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von
Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 740–44 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing diversity jurisdiction in cases
involving non-business corporations and applying the statutory rule), with Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors
v. Nat’l Real Estate Ass’n, Inc., 894 F.2d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the statutory rule on
diversity and looking to the shareholders as real parties in interest in a case involving a non-profit
corporation). For example, some benefit corporations may be public in nature, thereby calling into
question whether they can be considered a “citizen” of a state or a state entity. See Mich. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Allstate Painting & Contracting Co., No. 2:08-cv-286, 2009 WL 891702, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 31, 2009).
41. See House of Delegates Resolutions: 103B, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/news/
reporter_resources/annual-meeting-2015/house-of-delegates-resolutions/103b.html (last visited
June 30, 2017) [hereinafter ABA Resolution 103B].
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entities and have called for the Supreme Court to craft some sort of
judicial response.42 While such an effort might have been desirable, it
does not appear to be forthcoming in light of the Court’s decision in
Americold.43 As a result, this Article focuses exclusively on statutory
solutions.
I. THE PROBLEM
If Congress is to appreciate the scope of the problem created by
Americold, it must understand both the decision itself as well as the nature
and economic importance of commercial trusts. Both of these issues are
addressed in the following Subsections.
A. Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
The analysis begins with the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold.
The case involved a contract dispute between a number of corporations
whose goods were destroyed in a warehouse fire.44 The warehouse in
question was owned by Americold Realty Trust, a real estate investment
trust (REIT) formed under Maryland law, and the district court heard the
dispute pursuant to its jurisdiction under the diversity statute.45 However,
when the matter came up for appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit raised the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte and held that jurisdiction did not exist under the diversity statute.46
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit held that “the citizenship of any ‘noncorporate artificial entity’ is determined by considering all of the entity’s
‘members,’ which include, at minimum, its shareholders.”47 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the
citizenship of commercial trusts and affirmed the Tenth Circuit opinion.48
When considering this matter, the Supreme Court began by discussing
the long and somewhat troubled history of citizenship for legal persons.49
42. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro,
C.J., concurring) (“As Congress has not accepted the invitation of the Court to craft a workable
law of business citizenship, the latter should step into the breach.”).
43. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
44. Id. at 1014.
45. See id. at 1014; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(b).
46. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014.
47. Id. at 1015 (quoting ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 776 F.3d 1175,
1180–81 (10th Cir. 2015)).
48. See id.
49. See id. Commentators have argued that the lines between corporate and natural
personhood are becoming inappropriately blurred. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate
Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891–97 (2012)
(discussing theories of corporate personhood); Michalski, supra note 2, at 126–27 (discussing
corporate personhood in the context of jurisdictional concerns); S.I. Strong, Religious Rights in
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For example, the Court made an exception for corporations as early as
1844, deeming them to be citizens of the state in which they were
incorporated.50 That rule was subsequently codified by Congress in
1958.51 However, other artificial entities have continued to be considered
citizens of the state(s) of the entity’s individual members, despite
opposition from courts, commentators, and practitioners.52
The question to be resolved in Americold involved the definition of
the term “members” in the context of a commercial trust.53 To answer this
question, the Supreme Court looked to the law of the state under which
the trust was organized, a technique that has been criticized in other
contexts on the grounds that “state law should not delineate the limits of
federal jurisdictional reach.”54
According to Maryland law, REITs such as the one at issue in
Americold involve property that is held and managed “for the benefit and
profit of any person who may become a shareholder.”55 As a result, the
Supreme Court held that Americold’s members were comprised of its
various shareholders.56
Americold had argued a different proposition, claiming that its
citizenship should have been determined pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
rule in Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee,57 which was said to suggest that
“anything called a ‘trust’ possesses the citizenship of its trustees alone,
not its shareholder beneficiaries as well.”58 However, the Court rejected
Historical, Theoretical, and International Context: Hobby Lobby as a Jurisprudential Anomaly?,
48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 813, 820 (2015) (discussing corporate personhood in the context of
religious liberties); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West 2016) (defining a
“person” as including a business trust). The issue continues to vex the Court. See Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (providing corporations with religious
rights); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012) (holding only natural persons
can be liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act).
50. See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558
(1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
52. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015; Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d
99, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, C.J., concurring); Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99; Cohen, supra
note 40, at 272; Kleinberger, supra note 40, at 830; Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 1.
53. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015.
54. Recent Case, Diversity Jurisdiction—Definition of a Corporation Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2005) (discussing Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix &
von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015–16.
55. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-101(c),
8-102 (West 2016)).
56. See id. at 1016. Americold did not provide information on the citizenship of its
members, so it was impossible for the Supreme Court or any of the lower courts to determine
whether complete diversity existed. Id. at 1015–16.
57. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
58. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
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Americold’s argument on the grounds that Navarro involved situations
where a trustee brought suit in his, her, or its individual capacity rather
than matters where the trust itself was a party.59
The Court also discussed the correlation between “traditional” trusts
(i.e., those designed primarily for the intergenerational transfer of
personal wealth) and commercial trusts such as the REIT at issue in
Americold.60 Americold had argued that the longstanding jurisdictional
rule applicable to trusts (i.e., that the citizenship of the trust can and
should be equated with the citizenship of the trustee, not the beneficiaries)
should apply even to commercial trusts.61 However, the Court believed
that, at their core, traditional trusts constituted little more than a fiduciary
relationship that could not be made an independent party to a lawsuit,
which justified a rule deeming the citizenship of the trust to be the same
as the citizenship of the trustee.62 However, the Court found that “[m]any
States . . . have applied the ‘trust’ label to a variety of unincorporated
entities that have little in common with this traditional template.”63 The
various discrepancies between commercial and non-commercial trusts64
led the Court to adopt a bright line rule holding that “[s]o long as such an
entity is unincorporated, this Court will apply our ‘oft-repeated rule’ that
it possesses the citizenship of all its members.”65
Although the Court’s decision in Americold was unanimous, there are
signs that the Justices believed the holding was incorrect as a matter of
policy, even if the outcome was appropriate as a matter of law, and that
the Justices would therefore support a Congressional override.66 For
example, the Court specifically cited an earlier decision, Carden v.
Arkoma Associates,67 which recognized that a similar rule from 1990
involving the citizenship of partnerships could “validly be characterized
as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations
raised by the changing realities of business organization.”68 The Court in
Americold then stated that “[t]hen as now we reaffirm that it is up to

59. Id. In traditional trusts, a trust cannot sue or be sued in its own name; instead, suit must
be brought by or against the trustees. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 90–91.
60. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The differences are indeed significant. See infra Subsection I.B.1.
65. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016 (quoting Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S. 185, 195
(1990)).
66. See id. at 1017.
67. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
68. Id. at 196; Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 303 (discussing rules regarding limited
partnerships and limited liability corporations).
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Congress if it wishes to incorporate other entities into 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)’s special jurisdictional rule.”69
Congress is not insensitive to the need for statutory overrides of
Supreme Court decisions and has enacted such legislation on a variety of
occasions.70 This Article therefore recommends that Congress adopt
provisions to allow commercial trust disputes to be heard in federal court,
either by treating commercial trusts the same as corporations when it
comes to matters relating to citizenship or by eliminating the need for
complete diversity.71
B. Commercial Trusts
If Congress is to appreciate the need for action, it must understand the
nature and scope of commercial trusts. In some ways, this may be a
difficult task, since commentators universally agree that commercial
trusts “are a woefully under-analyzed and underappreciated form of
business organization,” even though these devices are “critically
important” to the national and international corporate communities.72
To some extent, it is unclear why commercial trusts have been ignored
in this manner. One reason may be that the complexity and diversity of
contemporary commercial trusts makes any sort of generalized analysis
difficult, if not impossible.73 Some scholars may be put off by the
challenges associated with researching commercial trusts74 or by the fact
that trusts are governed almost entirely by state rather than federal law.75
However, the most logical explanation derives from commercial trusts’
interstitial nature.76 Although the vast majority of assets held in trust
today are in commercial rather than traditional trusts, most specialists in
trust law focus on trusts created for estate planning purposes.77
69. Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
70. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1409–13 (discussing various overrides).
But see Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform:
An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1594 (2015) (suggesting Congress is less likely to
override the Supreme Court in certain types of cases).
71. See infra Part IV.
72. Miller, supra note 7, at 444.
73. See infra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing the types and nature of commercial trusts).
74. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 39 (remarking on the “puzzling experience” of finding only
a single reported decision under the Delaware business trust statute, despite the fact that trillions
of dollars are held in statutory commercial trusts).
75. See Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055.
76. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34.
77. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 166. This phenomenon is true both in academia and
in practice. See S.I. Strong, Global Developments in Trust Arbitration, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 4 n.4 (S.I. Strong ed., 2016) (noting
large law firms house trust specialists in their estates practice, although commercial trusts
generally fall within the domain of the corporate department).
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Unfortunately, the lacuna is not filled by the commercial law community,
since practitioners and scholars in that field concentrate largely on
corporations and unincorporated business forms such as limited liability
companies (LLCs) and partnerships.78 As a result, it is necessary to
provide a brief primer on commercial trusts to provide the foundation for
the arguments made elsewhere in this Article.79
1. Commercial Versus Non-Commercial Trusts
Although the Supreme Court downplayed the similarities between
commercial trusts and traditional trusts in Americold, the two
mechanisms do resemble one another in some regards.80 For example,
commercial and non-commercial trusts both separate legal and beneficial
ownership of a particular asset,81 with the trustee holding legal title to the
78. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 33 (noting “domestic business law scholars have a stunning
lack of familiarity with the business trust”). Many practitioners are similarly uninformed. See
Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1059.
79. This summary is necessary because many lawyers’ only reference for trusts is in law
school classes on estate planning. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of
Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1168–69 (2012).
80. Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016).
81. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 632–43, 669–71 (1995); see also DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ¶ 1.95 (David Hayton ed., 18th ed. 2010); WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS
369 (4th ed. 2010) (“The word ‘trust’ is used for many property arrangements that have little in
common with each other apart from the fact that they were historically enforced . . . in the Court
of Equity . . . .”). One internationally recognized set of criteria states that
the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships created—inter vivos or on
death—by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control
of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics—
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee’s
own estate;
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name
of another person on behalf of the trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance
with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by
law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent
with the existence of a trust.
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property for the benefit of the beneficiary, who holds equitable title to the
property.82 The person who creates and funds the trust is known as the
settlor.83 Both commercial and non-commercial trusts contemplate the
possibility that there may be more than one person in each role (for
example, there may be multiple settlors, multiple trustees, or multiple
beneficiaries).84 Furthermore, the same person may act in multiple roles
(for example, a settlor may also be a trustee, and a trustee may also be a
beneficiary) so long as there is not an identity between a single trustee
and a single beneficiary.85
Commercial and non-commercial trusts both give rise to two different
types of disputes: (1) external (third-party) disputes that involve
relationships with non-parties to the trust and (2) internal disputes that
address matters relating to the inner workings of the trust and involving
conflicts between some or all of the various parties to the trust.86 Of the
two types, internal disputes are by far the more common.87 Unfortunately,
these are precisely the types of disputes that are most at risk of falling
under the rule in Americold and thus being barred from federal court.88
Furthermore, reports suggest that hostile trust litigation is reaching “near
epidemic” levels, meaning that the judiciary can expect to see more of
these types of disputes in the coming years.89

Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition art. 2, July 1, 1985, 23
I.L.M. 1389 (1984) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Trusts].
82. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 370; Langbein, supra note 81, at 632. But see
Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 102 (noting some types of commercial trusts vest the title
to trust property in the trust as a legal entity). The various roles may be altered somewhat in some
statutory business trusts.
83. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 2; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note
81, at 370.
84. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 374–81.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (discussing
merger).
86. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 8.157–.167; Langbein, supra note 81, at 664.
Different commentators define internal and external trust disputes differently. See Paul Buckle &
Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649, 651 (2008); Tina Wüstemann,
Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2007, at 33, 38 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007).
87. See Michael Hwang, Arbitration for Trust Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S
LEADING EXPERTS IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 83, 83 (2009).
88. Internal disputes typically proceed in rem and therefore require participation of all
beneficiaries, which can number in the hundreds of thousands. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
External disputes would likely fall under the rule in Navarro, although the future applicability of
that case to commercial trusts is somewhat in doubt. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n. v. Lee, 446 U.S.
458, 465–66 (1980); see also supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
89. Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT’L TR. &
CORP. PLAN. 203, 203 (1999).
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Commentators sometimes seek to distinguish commercial and noncommercial trusts on the grounds that many commercial trusts are
statutory in nature.90 However, that issue is not as important as it may
initially appear, since many commercial trusts, including the well-known
Massachusetts business trust, are created by private agreements in the
form of trust deeds or declarations of trust rather than by compliance with
statutory or regulatory formalities.91 As a result, many of the key legal
principles relating to commercial trusts are found in the common law
rather than in statutes.92 This phenomenon has led Professor Robert
Sitkoff to suggest that there are significant differences between so-called
“common-law business trusts” and “statutory business trusts.”93
Most issues involving the administration of commercial trusts are
decided under the same principles that apply to non-commercial trusts.94
Commercial and non-commercial trusts are also both governed primarily
by state rather than federal law,95 with relatively little harmonization
90. Twenty-two states have enacted statutes dealing with business trusts. See ALA. CODE
§§ 19-3-60 to -66 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1871 to -1879 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 3801–3826 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.01–.08 (West 2016); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-5-1-1 to -11 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2027 to -2038 (West 2016); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 386.370–.440 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 182, §§ 1–14 (West 2016);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 318.01–.06 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -205 (West
2016); N.Y. GEN. ASS’NS LAW §§ 1–19-a (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-44 to 47 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1746.01–.99 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§§ 171–174 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 128.560–.600 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3353-10 to -50 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-14A-1 to -96 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48101-201 to -207 (West 2016); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 6133–6138 (West 2015); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.010–.060 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -7 (West
2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 226.14 (West 2016); see also MYRON KOVE ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 247 (2016); Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 35–36 (noting some difficulties in estimating
the proper number of statutes on business trusts and placing the number in 2005 between
seventeen and thirty-four).
91. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:15 (database updated Dec. 2016); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055.
92. See Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1059; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 38.
93. Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32–33.
94. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247; Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1066.
Some states, such as Arizona, provide that business trusts are construed pursuant to principles of
corporation law. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1879 (2016).
95. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 42 (questioning whether state law is the dominant factor in
commercial trust law). Federal law primarily comes into play in the area of tax laws, blue sky
laws, and the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A)(v) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 301-77014(a) (2016); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (reflecting the “check-the-box regulation” that
allows commercial trusts to choose whether to be taxed as a corporation or a partnership for
purposes of the federal tax purposes); KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, §§ 247, 270.40. Federal law
also requires employee pension funds to adopt the trust form. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34.
Constitutional issues occasionally come into play. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550
(1928) (upholding the constitutionality of state legislation requiring foreign commercial trusts to
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across state lines.96
As important as these similarities are, there are numerous ways that
commercial trusts differ from traditional trusts. Perhaps the most
important difference involves the purpose of the trust. Although
commercial trusts operate under a variety of names (such as business
trusts, Massachusetts trusts, or statutory trusts, depending on the
context),97 all typically “implement[] bargained-for exchange, in contrast
to a donative transfer,” which is the primary motivation for trusts created
to pass on personal or family wealth.98 Thus, “the settlor in a gratuitous
[non-commercial] trust receives no compensation for the conveyance
whereas the settlor in a commercial trust—typically a corporation or
financial institution—always receives payment for the assets conveyed to
the trust.”99 Furthermore, “[i]n ordinary trusts the settlor is seldom also
the sole or principal beneficiary; in business trusts the trust res consists
of property originally contributed by the beneficiaries themselves.”100
Together, these factors demonstrate that commercial trusts are created
for business rather than donative purposes.101 However, the business
activities associated with a commercial trust do not need to be either
active or extensive in nature.102 Furthermore, commercial trusts do not
necessarily have to include the word “trust” in their name and may instead
“qualify” before doing business in a particular state and distinguishing commercial trusts from
traditional trusts to the extent that commercial trusts are “clothed with the ordinary functions and
attributes of a corporation”).
96. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (referring to statutory investment trusts and
subdivision and land trusts); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055; see also Robert J.
D’Agostino, The Business Trust and Bankruptcy Remoteness, 2011 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 4. The Uniform Law Commission has made some attempts to harmonize the law in this area.
See
Acts:
Statutory
Trust
Entity
Act,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Statutory%20Trust%20Entity%20Act (last visited
Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter USTEA]. However, the USTEA has only been adopted in two
jurisdictions (Kentucky and the District of Columbia). See id.
97. See 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15.
98. Langbein, supra note 8, at 166–67. For examples of how commercial trusts operate, see
Mark Kantor, The Use of Trusts in Financing Transactions: Special Issues Relating to Arbitration
of Commercial Trusts, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 15, 16–25 (discussing trusts in the context of bond
indentures, securitizations, lease financings and mutual funds); Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 326.
99. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 562 (footnote omitted).
100. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
101. See id.; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 38–39. For this reason, some authorities exclude
commercial trusts from their analyses. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts excludes
business trusts from consideration and focuses solely on donative trusts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (“Although many rules of trust law also apply to business and
investment trusts, many of these rules do not . . . . [T]he business trust is a business arrangement
that can best be dealt with in connection with business associations . . . .”).
102. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
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use terms (such as “company,” “association,” or “limited”) that could be
used to describe other types of business organizations.103
This is not to say that non-commercial trusts cannot have certain
business-oriented goals. For example, commercial and non-commercial
trusts both provide protection from insolvency and some forms of
taxation while also creating a fiduciary regime that requires the
application of fiduciary duties such as loyalty and prudence.104
Furthermore, a trust can operate a business without being considered a
commercial trust.105 This distinction has been recognized by the Internal
Revenue Service, which differentiates between “ordinary trusts,” which
have as their purpose the protection and conservation of property for the
benefit of the beneficiaries pursuant to the standard rules of probate or
chancery, and trusts that are formed for the purpose of making a profit
through the use of the combined capital of various investors.106
Although commercial trusts have a business purpose, parties
frequently adopt the commercial trust form to take advantage of the
structural flexibility inherent in trusts and create relationships or
procedures that might be difficult or impossible to achieve if the venture
were organized as a corporation, particularly with respect to “matters of
internal governance and . . . the creation of beneficial interests.”107
“Transaction planners designing asset securitization trusts especially
welcome the freedom to carve beneficial interests without regard to
traditional classes of corporate shares,” creating a wide range of “socalled tranches, each embodied in its own class of trust security.”108
Interest in commercial trusts has grown exponentially in recent years due
to the increased liberalization of laws regarding the use and creation of
such devices.109
103. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3814(c) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A.3010(15) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1214(A) (West 2016); Rutledge & Habbart, supra
note 15, at 1065. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-506(c) (West 2016). This may be one of
the reasons why researchers have so many difficulties identifying commercial trusts. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
104. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 179–83, 189.
105. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15; Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1099.
Some authorities suggest that “[w]here a part or all of the trust property consists of a business but
no certificates of interest are issued the trust is not technically a business trust.” See KOVE ET AL.,
supra note 90, § 247 n.25; see also id. §§ 571–79.
106. See Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-4(a) (2016).
107. Langbein, supra note 8, at 183.
108. Id. at 183 n.109 (“A tranche is simply a slice of a deal, a payment stream whose expected
return increases with its riskiness.”).
109. See USTEA, supra note 96; Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in
Trusts: The U.S. Developments and a Comparative Perspective, 3 REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL
DERECHO (INDRET) 1, 20 (2008); Dante Figueroa, Civil Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of
Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L
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Commercial and non-commercial trusts reflect other key
differences.110 For example, some types of commercial trusts vest the title
to trust property in the trust as a legal entity, rather than in the trustees, as
is the case with traditional trusts.111 Furthermore, many commercial trusts
are now able to sue and be sued in their own name.112 However, this latter
issue can become problematic, since Rule 17(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure indicates that the ability of an unincorporated entity to
sue in its own name is determined pursuant to the law of the state where
the court is located.113 Since commercial trusts often cannot know in
advance where they will be sued, they cannot anticipate whether and to
what extent they will be able to sue or be sued in their own name.114 This
approach differs from Rule 17(b)(2) relating to corporations, which
indicates that the ability to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the
state of incorporation.115 Of course, if the rule in Americold is allowed to
stand, many commercial trusts will not be able to sue or be sued in federal
court, which eliminates concerns about Rule 17(b)(3).116
Other differences exist between commercial and non-commercial
trusts. For example, commercial trusts typically refer to beneficiaries as
“shareholders” or “members” and allow for the free transfer of beneficial
interests in the trust, often through the issuance of certificates.117
Commercial trusts also give beneficiaries the ability to elect, remove, or
control the various trustees and amend the terms of the trust, something
that is difficult or impossible with traditional trusts, at least without settlor
consent.118 Differences also exist with respect to the residual interest in

& COMP. L. 701, 721–39 (2007); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J.
356, 359–64 (2005).
110. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 37–38 (noting the potential “mismatch between traditional
trust law . . . and the exigencies of enterprise organization”).
111. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 103.
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).
113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3); see also Recent Case, supra note 54, at 1347 (discussing
Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gotard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004), and arguing
that “state law should not delineate the limits of federal jurisdictional reach”).
114. Commercial trusts could attempt to override this policy through a choice of law or
choice of forum provision, but such clauses would likely be unable to cover all issues and all
potential parties. See infra Subsection III.B.2 and accompanying text.
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(2).
116. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016); FED.
R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).
117. See Jonathan J. Ossip, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Trusts, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2301,
2333–34 (2014).
118. See Thales Alenia Space France v. Thermo Funding Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 287, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ossip, supra note 117, at 2334.
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the corpus of the trust.119 For example, a settlor in a commercial trust
“almost always retains a residual interest in trust assets that remain once
the business transaction is concluded” while a settlor in a traditional trust
may or may not do so.120 Commercial trusts may also feature centralized
management, perpetual existence, and state registration requirements that
are not seen with traditional trusts.121
2. Types of Commercial Trusts
If Congress is to appreciate the scope of the problem created by
Americold, then it must understand the role that commercial trusts play
in the economic life of the nation.122 Commercial trusts currently reflect
a significant proportion of the trusts currently in operation in the United
States. Indeed, “well over 90% of the money held in trust in the United
States” in recent years has been held “in commercial trusts as opposed to
personal trusts.”123 As a result, numerous commentators have concluded
that “the role of trusts in intrafamily wealth transfers is today ‘relatively
trivial,’” particularly when compared to the “enormously important” role
of trusts in the business context.124
While the following discussion does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive list of all commercial trusts now in existence, it
nevertheless illustrates how pervasive these instruments now are in the
U.S. and global economies.125 Furthermore, new forms of commercial
119. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (regarding differences between
corporations and commercial trusts with respect to residual interests).
120. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 562.
121. See Thales, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
122. Some commentators distinguish between statutory trusts and commercial trusts, but that
level of detail does not appear necessary here. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 93–94
(discussing the USTEA); see also Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 564–72 (discussing and
distinguishing various types of commercial trusts, including trusts used as special purpose
vehicles (SPVs), trusts used for diversifying lending risk, master trusts, business trusts, trust
indentures, deeds of trust, mutual funds, and REITs).
123. Langbein, supra note 8, at 166–67, 178 (citing figures from mid- to late-1990s).
Commercial trusts have also become increasingly popular outside the United States. See id. at
166; see also HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 1.97–1.138; Figueroa, supra note 109, at 740–51;
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 26, at 434–35.
124. Henry Christensen III, Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, ALI CLE EST. PLAN.
COURSE MATERIALS J., Dec. 2014, at 29, 30.
125. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (describing some types and uses of commercial
trusts). For a list of the various types of trusts recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, see
Christensen, supra note 124, at 31 (listing nineteen separate categories of trusts). For a brief
history of the development of the commercial trust from the nineteenth century to the present, see
Peter B. Oh, Business Trusts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 268, 269–73 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J.
Lowenstein eds., 2015); Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 86–92.
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trusts are being developed all the time.126
Some commentators, most notably Professor Steven Schwarcz, have
attempted to provide a taxonomy of commercial trusts that relies on two
different attributes: “the ‘type’ of trust,” which focuses on particular
labels given to the trust in question, and “the business use to which the
trust has been placed.”127 Both methods “are needed because there is
sometimes an imprecise correlation between labels and functions: certain
entities called trusts are not trusts, and other entities may be trusts even
though they do not go by that name.”128
The first and perhaps most important type of commercial trust is the
pension trust, which arises out of contracts of employment and provides
employees with the ability to defer some of their compensation until
retirement.129 Although pension trusts include a private contribution
element, the trusts themselves are often statutory in nature pursuant to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),130 which
indicates that “all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust.”131
The amount of pension assets under management in the United States
was over $24 trillion in 2014,132 with similarly significant amounts held

126. For example, New Zealand has recently developed the “trading trust,” which is
distinguishable from unit or investment trusts. See L. COMMISSION (N.Z.), COURT JURISDICTION,
TRADING TRUSTS AND OTHER ISSUES: REVIEW OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: REVIEW OF THE LAW OF
TRUSTS FIFTH ISSUES PAPER 66–67 (2011), http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-lawtrusts?quicktabs_23=issues_paper.
127. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 563–64.
128. Id. at 564.
129. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.127; Langbein, supra note 8, at 168–69.
130. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and
29 U.S.C.).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012). The United Kingdom recognizes a related type of statutory
trust known as the employee trust, which is not tied to retirement but which instead provides
certain tax-related and other benefits to current employees. See Pensions Act 1995, c. 26,
§ 124(1)–(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/26/contents/enacted. To the extent
a pension trust dispute is governed by federal law, it would not have to rely on diversity
jurisdiction to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction and would thus be exempt from
concerns arising out of Americold. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1012, 1014 (2016). But see RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689, 691–92
(7th Cir. 2016) (applying Americold in a dispute involving a pension trust).
132. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PENSION MARKETS IN FOCUS 7
(2015), http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/globalpensionstatistics.htm [hereinafter
OECD, PENSION MARKETS]; see also id. at 7, 16 (noting diverse make-up of pension funds);
Langbein, supra note 8, at 168–69 (noting in 1997 that private pension plans held assets in the
realm of $3 trillion, with state and federal plans for governmental employees holding an additional
$1.6 trillion in assets, primarily in trust form). While recent market vicissitudes have changed the
amount held in private and public pension plans since the late 1990s, the amount in question is
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in trust in other countries.133 Although these numbers are impressive on
their own, their importance becomes even clearer when one considers that
in 2015 the market value of the publicly listed U.S. domestic stock market
was approximately $25.067 trillion.134 Pension trusts can have thousands
of participants, as illustrated by the Steelworkers Pension Trust, which
has over 500 participating employers and more than 112,000 participants,
including active, retired, and terminated (vested) employees.135
Another kind of commercial trust is the investment or unit trust.136
These types of devices are often international in nature and also control a
staggering amount of money.137 For example, in 2014, the largest British
investment trust by assets (Alliance Trust) managed £3.2 billion in assets
reflecting a global portfolio, with 46% of its holdings in North
America.138 American investment trusts operate on a similar scale, with

nevertheless vast. See Younkyun Park, Employee Benefit Research Institute, NOTES, Apr. 2009,
at 1, 2.
133. See OECD, PENSION MARKETS, supra note 132, at 7 (noting assets of private pension in
OECD countries was in excess of $38 trillion in 2014). OPTrust, a Canadian pension plan,
manages $19 billion in assets. See About OPTrust, OPTRUST, http://www.optrust.com/
aboutoptrust/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). The 1,000 largest U.S. retirement plans held
assets of approximately $8.84 trillion in 2015. See James Comtois, Assets of Largest Retirement
Funds Tumble 2.3% For Year, PENSIONS & INV. (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/
article/20160208/PRINT/302089971/assets-of-largest-retirement-funds-tumble-23-for-year. In
early 2016, Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, said to be the world’s largest pension
fund, reported a loss in excess of $50 billion, demonstrating the magnitude of these types of
business entities as well as the public policy implications. See Robin Harding, Japan Pension
Fund Loses $50bn, FIN. TIMES (July 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9138aba6-555b-11e6befd-2fc0c26b3c60?mhq5j=e3 (noting the portfolio included domestic and international
holdings).
134. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$), WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2014&locations=US (last
visited June 30, 2017).
135. See STEELWORKERS PENSION TR., http://www.steelworkerspension.com/. OPTrust, a
Canadian pension plan, has approximately 90,000 members and retirees. See About OPTrust,
supra note 133.
136. The term “investment trust” is more common in the United States, with the term “unit
trust” being used in England. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.122; Langbein, supra note
8, at 170. For a brief description of the differences between unit and investment trusts, see Faith
Glasgow, 10 Things You Need to Know About Investment Trusts, MONEYWISE (May 19, 2011),
http://www.moneywise.co.uk/investing/funds/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-investmenttrusts.
137. See Bosques-Hernández, supra note 109, at 20.
138. See Marc Shoffman, Top 20 Most Watched Investment Trusts: Investors Attracted to
“Dividend Heroes”—and Size Isn’t Everything, THIS IS MONEY.CO.UK (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/investing/article-2604385/Most-viewed-investmenttrusts-revealed-performed.html.
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one industry member calculating the assets held by 181 providers of
collective investment trusts to be approximately $2 trillion.139
Investment and unit trusts include a number of well-known types of
commercial instruments, including mutual funds,140 REITs, which were
the type of instrument seen in Americold,141 oil and gas royalty trusts,142
and asset securitization trusts.143 Some of these types of trusts (such as
asset securitization trusts) may not involve a large number of
shareholders and may not be unduly affected by the decision in
Americold.144 However, other types of investment or unit trusts feature
139. See COALITION COLLECTIVE INV. TR., COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 13 (2015),
http://www.ctfcoalition.com/portalresource/CollectiveInvestmentTrustsWhitePaper.pdf
(estimated as of the fourth quarter of 2013); see also Kevin Mahn, Why Unit Investment Trusts
Can Be a Good Investment Alternative, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/advisor/2013/04/22/why-unit-investment-trusts-can-be-a-good-investment-alternative/
#3e950c8361ec (“According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), data on the market value
of unit investment trusts (UITs) issued and outstanding as of year-end 2012 indicates a total of
5,787 trusts with a value of $71.73 billion.”).
140. Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 34 (“[M]ore than half of all mutual funds are organized as
trusts.”) These are known as collective investment schemes in England. See HAYTON ET AL., supra
note 81, ¶ 1.122.
141. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1014 (2016). REITs
are mutual funds that invest in real property or in mortgages on real property. See Langbein, supra
note 8, at 171 (noting that in 1997, U.S.-based REITs held over $98 billion in assets). Interestingly,
calls have been made to reduce, rather than increase, the regulation of REITs in the wake of the
recent financial crisis, thereby showing the level of legislative support for these types of
investment vehicles. See Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 585, 589 (2009).
142. Langbein, supra note 8, at 171. These types of trusts are often created by oil
corporations that want a vehicle to hold legal title to certain oil-producing properties while
dispensing beneficial assets to corporate shareholders. Id. The trust interests can be sold, and
several of the larger oil-royalty trusts are publicly traded. See id. at 171–72. Trusts relating to
royalties from intellectual property are also possible. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 1.135.
143. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 20–22. In this form of trust, banks or other financial
entities, often called originators or packagers, buy a type of debt (such as credit card receivables),
“but then transfer[] [the debt] in trust to a separate trustee. Shares in that trust are sold to various
participating investors, who, under the new scheme, are not lenders to the bank but share owners
in the trust.” Langbein, supra note 8, at 172. Changes have been made to the specific rules
regarding these types of investment vehicles in the wake of the recent financial crisis, but the
concept remains viable. See Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and Convergences of Common
Law and Civil Law Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
517, 527–54 (2010); Peter A. Furci, U.S. Trade or Business Implications of Distressed-Debt
Investing, 63 TAX LAW. 527, 537 (2010) (discussing U.S. regulations under the now-repealed
Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)); Grace Soyon Lee, What’s in a Name?:
The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of Credit Card Securitizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110,
126 n.82 (2010) (noting FASITs were repealed in 2004 but recognizing the continued use of
similar devices).
144. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1012 (holding that a trust’s members included its
shareholders for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Indeed, many commercial trusts operate very
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large numbers of geographically diverse shareholders. For example, the
Internal Revenue Code requires any entity seeking to be classified as a
REIT to have at least one hundred beneficial owners.145 Some publicly
traded REITs far exceed this minimum and offer millions of shares for
individual or institutional purchase.146 The amount of money involved in
these instruments is impressive. For example, as of August 31, 2016,
“there were 189 REITs listed on the New York Stock Exchange” with “a
combined equity market capitalization of $986 billion.”147
A third kind of commercial trust involves trusts relating to the
issuance of bonds.148 In the United States, such trusts arise under the Trust
Indenture Act,149 which requires “most debt securities issued in the
United States . . . to provide for the services of a corporate fiduciary to
act as trustee for the bondholders or other obligees.”150
Trusts created under the Trust Indenture Act reflect certain unusual
qualities.151 For example, trustees under bond indentures have fewer
responsibilities for the trust property and typically do not enjoy
possession or the right to possession until a default occurs.152 Instead:
The trustee under a bond indenture acts primarily under the
terms of the contract creating the relationship, and acquires
actual possession of the particular assets only in the event
that the issuer breaches the covenants of the loan agreement.
The indenture regime imposes, therefore, a species of
contingent or standby trusteeship.
What commends the trust form for these corporate and
municipal bond transactions is the ability to have a
sophisticated financial intermediary—that is, a trust
much like secured loans or holding companies. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 16–22; Schwarcz,
supra note 7, at 562–63 (describing structured finance deals).
145. See I.R.C. § 856(a)(5) (2012); Treas. Reg. 1.856-1(b)(6) (2016). Although many REITs
are trusts, the Internal Revenue Code allows corporate entities to qualify as REITs. See I.R.C.
§ 856(a).
146. For example, one publicly traded REIT has over 96 million shares of common stock.
See CIM Commercial Trust Announced Preliminary Results of Tender Offer, supra note 11. These
numbers appear to contradict suggestions by some scholars that commercial trusts have smaller
numbers of interested parties than do publicly traded corporations. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at
43.
147. Understanding the Basics of REITs, REIT.COM, https://www.reit.com/investing/reitbasics/faqs/basics-reits (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
148. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 16–20 (discussing bond indentures).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2012).
150. Langbein, supra note 8, at 173 (estimating that as of 1997, the amount held in these
types of trusts exceeded $3 trillion).
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa.
152. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 173–74.
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company—act on behalf of numerous and dispersed
bondholders in the event that a loan transaction does not
work out routinely. The indenture trustee overcomes the
coordination problem that inheres in widespread public
ownership of debt securities.153
Other countries also recognize the concept of bond-related trusts,
whereby a trust deed gives a trustee both the responsibility and the
authority to enforce the terms of the bonds held in the trust.154 Bondrelated trusts arise frequently in international disputes involving U.S.
parties and thus may generate disputes heard in U.S. courts, thereby
falling under the Americold rule.155 As with other types of commercial
trusts, bond-related trusts account for billions of dollars’ worth of
assets.156
A fourth type of commercial trust involves “the ‘regulatory
compliance trust,’ [which is] a trust created primarily for the purpose of
discharging responsibilities imposed by law.”157 These trusts include
nuclear decommissioning trusts, environmental remediation trusts,
liquidating trusts, prepaid funeral trusts, foreign insurers trusts, and law
office trust accounts, just to name a few.158 Although a number of these
types of trusts (for example, environmental remediation trusts and nuclear
decommissioning trusts) are largely local in nature,159 others (such as
153. Id. at 174 (footnote omitted). A related type of device involves a trust created to
establish a contingent value right (CVR) which requires an acquiring party “to pay additional
consideration to a Target company’s stockholders following the close of the acquisition
contingent on the occurrence of specified payment triggers.” Barbara L. Borden & Henry
Gosebruch, Contingent Value Rights Outline, 1902 PLI/CORP. 323, 325 (Sept. 22–23, 2011); see
also id. at 340 (noting CVRs can be “issued pursuant to a trust agreement”).
154. See, e.g., Law Debenture Tr. Corp. v. Elektrim S.A. [2009] EWHC 1801 ¶¶ 1, 11 (Ch)
(Eng.).
155. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Kantor,
supra note 98, at 19–20. The existence of the Trust Indenture Act does not guarantee the existence
of a federal question allowing for federal jurisdiction in cases involving bonds. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aaa; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question
Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 46–47 (1984); Sarah L.
Reid & Robert W. Schumacher, Automatic Assignability of Claims: The Tension Between Federal
and New York State Law, 125 BANKING L.J. 725, 726 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction
and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 697 (2005).
156. See Mahn, supra note 139 (noting reports that at the end of 2012 there were “2,808 taxfree bond trusts, with a market value of $15.76 billion” and “553 taxable bond trusts, with a market
value of $4.06 billion”).
157. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 174.
158. See id. at 175–76.
159. Examples of these types of trusts are publicly available. See SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, DECOMMISSIONING TRUST AGREEMENT FOR PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING
STATION 1 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/31978/000119312506107242/
dex1003.htm (containing terms of a decommissioning trust agreement in El Paso); SEMPRA
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foreign insurers trusts) are not and would therefore be affected by the rule
in Americold.160 International insurance and reinsurance play a
significant role in the U.S. economy,161 and requiring foreign insurers’
trusts to appear in state court rather than federal court as per the rule in
Americold would doubtless cause numerous problems as a matter of both
commercial and foreign relations.162
While there are numerous other types of commercial trusts in
existence, it is unnecessary to outline them all, since the question for this
Article is whether and to what extent the rule enunciated in Americold
will detrimentally affect commercial practices. As this Section has
shown, the effect of Americold will be both broad and deep, and will
resonate across both the U.S. and global economies. It is possible that
Congress could intend such a result. However, a closer comparison of
commercial trusts and corporations suggests that the better approach
would be to treat the two business forms similarly and allow commercial
trusts to have the same sort of access to federal courts that corporations
do.163
II. COMMERCIAL TRUSTS VERSUS CORPORATIONS
If Congress is to justify differential treatment of commercial trusts and
corporations, there must be a discernable difference between the two
types of business organizations. The following Subsections therefore
compare the two business forms as both a practical and theoretical matter.

ENERGY, NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING TRUST FUND (2014), https://www.sdge.com/sites/
default/files/documents/2004502471/NDTF.pdf (containing notice of terms of a nuclear
decommissioning trust in San Diego).
160. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015–16. A foreign insurer that wishes
to accept surplus lines insurance typically starts the process with an application
for inclusion on the Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers published by the
International Insurers Department of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). This includes the establishment of a trust fund of no
less than $5.4 million for the benefit of its U.S. policyholders, which is revalued
annually based on U.S. liabilities.
John P. Dearie & Michael Griffin, Overseas Insurers, RISK MGMT. (Feb./Jan. 2009),
http://cf.rims.org/Magazine/PrintTemplate.cfm?AID=3835.
161. See S.I. Strong, The Special Nature of International Insurance and Reinsurance
Arbitration: A Response to Professor Jerry, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 283, 314 n.229 (citing statistics
indicating “that 62% of U.S. insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although
that number rises to 92% if the fact that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is
taken into account”); see also infra notes 437–40 (regarding Lloyd’s of London).
162. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015.
163. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
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A. Practical Issues
Professor Edward Purcell has claimed that “jurisdictional reform in
the United States has been an intensely practical matter, a series of
pragmatic responses to pressing real-world problems.”164 As a result, it is
important to consider the practical differences between commercial trusts
and corporations to see whether Congress should override the Supreme
Court’s distinction between the two entities in matters involving diversity
jurisdiction.165
One of the country’s leading experts on commercial trusts, Professor
Schwarcz, has suggested that the key difference between corporations
and commercial trusts is “the degree to which assets need to be placed at
risk in order to satisfy the expectations of residual claimants.”166 Thus,
[i]n a corporation, the residual claims are sold to third-party
investors (shareholders) who expect management to use
corporate assets to obtain a profitable return on their
investments. . . .
In contrast, a commercial trust’s residual claimant is
typically the settlor of the trust, who . . . does not expect a
risk-weighted return. The expectations of the trust’s senior
and residual claimants are therefore the same: to preserve the
value of the trust assets.167
As a result, commercial trusts and corporations are considered
“mirror-image entities that respond to different investor needs.”168
Although commercial trusts differ from corporations in this regard,
there are a number of important practical similarities between the two
types of organizations. For example, commercial trusts reflect at least
four attributes that are normally associated with corporations: centralized

164. Purcell, supra note 3, at 1825; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Procedure, Politics,
Prediction, and Professors: A Response to Professors Burbank and Purcell, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2153 (2008) (noting the role of politics).
165. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15; KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247. Some
commentators have suggested that one of the key differences between commercial trusts and
corporations is that the latter is created by statute and the former is created by agreement. See
Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies,
13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 423–24 (1988). While this may be true in some cases, many commercial
trusts are statutory in nature. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. As a result, this
Article will not consider this particular issue.
166. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561.
167. Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (regarding
residual interests in commercial and non-commercial trusts).
168. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561.
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management, continuity of existence, limited liability for the shareholder
beneficiaries, and transferability of ownership.169
Structurally, the commercial trust’s foundational document (the
declaration or deed of trust) works like a corporation’s charter or articles
of incorporation by establishing the business purpose(s) of the trust and
setting forth the rights and responsibilities of both the trustees (who hold
legal title to the trust) and the shareholder-beneficiaries (who hold
certificates reflecting the nature and scope of their equitable title to the
trust).170 The trustees of a commercial trust carry out duties similar to
those of the board of directors of a corporation, although business is
typically conducted in the trustees’ own names rather than that of the trust
itself.171 Trustees of commercial trusts owe a fiduciary duty to
shareholders and represent shareholders in a manner similar to that of the
directors of a corporation, although fiduciary duties in the corporate
context are derivative in nature.172
In general, shareholder beneficiaries of a commercial trust have no
duties of their own and are considered passive investors with the right to
increase or relinquish ownership through the transfer of certificates as
shares or units of interest.173 However, there are some variations on this
theme.174 For example,
[s]ome courts have held that to avoid individual shareholder
liability the board of trustees must be a self-perpetuating
body with the power to fill vacancies and that shareholders
must be denied all rights except the right to receive dividends
and their distributive shares of the assets on termination of
the enterprise.175
Other jurisdictions indicate that shareholders are not personally liable
unless they have the “ultimate power of control.”176 Commentators have
suggested that various types of indirect control (such as the ability to elect
trustees, fill vacancies on the board of trustees, amend the declaration of
trust or dissolve the trust as a whole) should not provide sufficient
grounds for shareholder liability.177 Notably, these powers, which
resemble the power of majority control seen in many corporations, far
169. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15. Trustees retain personal liability unless the
deed of trust or contract with the creditor indicates otherwise. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
175. COX & HAZEN, supra note 91, § 1:15.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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exceed those given to beneficiaries of non-commercial trusts absent
settlor consent.178 As a result of these and other corporate influences on
commercial trusts, the overwhelming majority of authorities view
commercial trusts as the functional equivalents of corporations.179
B. Theoretical Issues
Although most comparisons of corporations and commercial trusts
have focused on practical concerns, Congress may find it useful to
consider the theoretical nature of the two devices when determining its
response to Americold.180 If commercial trusts can be considered the
theoretical equivalents of corporations as well as their functional
equivalents, then there appears to be little if any reason to allow the rule
in Americold to stand.181 In fact, as the following discussion shows, there
are significant similarities between the theoretical purposes of
commercial trusts and corporations, which would suggest a similar need
for access to federal courts.
1. Commercial Trusts
Although the legal community has long been aware of the many
practical similarities involving commercial trusts and corporations, little
if any attention has been devoted to theoretical comparisons between the
two business forms.182 Initially, it might appear as if commercial trusts
had little theoretical overlap with corporations, given the predominance
of the donative theory of trust law.183 This theory states that trusts are not
contracts but instead reflect “a unilateral transfer of assets to a person
178. See id. § 1:15 n.15 (citing Massachusetts Supreme Court); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 51, 57–59, 60, 64–65 (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
179. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548 (1928); Miller, supra note 7, at 446 n.8;
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32.
180. Commentators have debated whether and to what extent theory describes or drives legal
reform. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 176 (1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
201, 241–43; Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1994).
181. See Hemphill, 277 U.S. at 548 (noting functional equivalence of two business forms);
Miller, supra note 7, at 444; Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 31.
182. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries
of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 570 (2007) (offering a single unsupported, conclusory statement);
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 126–27
(1991) (offering a limited analysis focusing on contract theory of the corporation); Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 45 (noting the need for this type of theoretical analysis). But see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 989–91 (1929) (discussing
theoretical issues involving corporations and commercial trusts in the context of Hemphill, 277
U.S. 537).
183. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1174–75 (discussing U.S. and English law).
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prepared to accept the office of trustee with the benefits and burdens
attached to such office.”184
The donative theory of trust law was initially promoted in the United
States by Austin Scott, the Reporter of the first Restatement of Trusts, as
a means of guaranteeing that trust law remained with the specialist equity
bench rather than being subsumed into the common law.185 “[F]or Scott,
having the Restatement deny the contractarian character of the trust was
a means of buttressing the jury-free preserve of equity judges . . . .”186 As
a result, the Restatement of Trusts considers only two types of trusts (the
constructive trust and the resulting trust, which both arise as remedial
measures as a matter of law) to be non-donative in nature.187
However, commercial trusts exist in something of a theoretical limbo.
Both the second and third iterations of the Restatement of Trusts
expressly exclude commercial trusts from their purview, which suggests
that commercial trusts could be subject to a different theoretical
paradigm.188 The most logical candidate is the contractual theory of
trusts, which had the support of numerous scholars (including Frederic
Maitland) prior to the adoption of the first Restatement.189 A number of
contemporary commentators, most notably Professor John Langbein, also
favor this characterization of trust law. As Professor Langbein has stated:
[A]lthough the typical trust implements a donative transfer,
it embodies a contract-like relationship in the underlying
deal between the settlor and the trustee about how the trustee
will manage the trust assets and distribute them to the trust
beneficiaries. The difference between a trust and a thirdparty beneficiary contract is largely a lawyers’
conceptualism.190
184. HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶ 11.83; see also Strong, supra note 79, at 1174–81
(discussing the contractual theory, donative theory, and alternative theories of trust law).
185. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 644–45, 648–50.
186. Id. at 649.
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
188. See id. § 1, cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
There has been some suggestion that an “agency cost theory” could apply to commercial trusts,
but that work is still at a relatively early stage of development. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency
Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) (limiting the analysis to
donative trusts but suggesting it may be applicable to commercial trusts in the future); Lee-ford
Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2579, 2587 n.13 (2011) (referring to the importance and significance of commercial trusts yet still
putting them outside the scope of the private trust analysis).
189. See Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 644–45, 648–50.
190. Langbein, supra note 8, at 185 (citation omitted). Other commentators have noted that
even if the contractarian approach is considered “unsuitable for the two-party declaration of
trust . . . such an observation in no way invalidates the contract approach to the more traditional

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss4/6

30

Strong: Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdicti

2017]

CONGRESS AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS

1051

Under this approach, the trust is viewed as “a deal, a bargain about
how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed.”191
Although Professor Langbein was focusing primarily on traditional
intergenerational trusts, the persuasiveness of the contractarian theory of
trust law is even more pronounced in the case of the commercial trust,
since those devices are bereft of any type of donative element.192 Indeed,
even if traditional intergenerational trusts cannot be seen as having a
contractual nature, commercial trusts, which reflect “an arm’s-length,
negotiated bargain in which all parties benefit,” cannot realistically be
viewed in any other light.193
While U.S.-trained lawyers view the contractual theory of trusts as
conflicting with the donative theory of trusts, not every country
experiences the same type of jurisprudential tension. Instead, a number
of jurisdictions, particularly certain civil law nations that have adopted
their own domestic version of the trust, view these instruments through
an exclusively contractual lens.194
Trusts can also be conceptualized by reference to their intended
purpose.195 The primary purpose test is often used by bankruptcy courts
to determine whether a particular entity is a commercial trust that is
eligible for protection under the Bankruptcy Code or a family trust that is
intended to preserve the res and thus is not eligible for protection under
the Bankruptcy Code.196 However, these principles can be used in other
three-party trust where the grantor does not act as the trustee.” Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D.
Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly
Trust Litigation, but Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 362 (2007); see
Langbein, supra note 81, at 627, 645. The two-party declaration trust, also known as a selfdeclarative trust, arises when a settlor declares him or herself to be the trustee of certain identified
property for the benefit of another person rather than naming another person to act as trustee. See
HAYTON ET AL., supra note 81, ¶¶ 12.7–12.8; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 81, at 374. Notably,
self-declarative trusts are virtually never seen in the commercial context. See id. at 374–75;
Langbein, supra note 81, at 672.
191. Langbein, supra note 81, at 627.
192. See id. at 631.
193. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 563. Some commentators, most notably Professor Larry
Ribstein, have relied on the commercial trust as a means of suggesting that corporation law can
and should be characterized pursuant to a type of contract theory. See Ribstein, supra note 182,
at 126–27 (noting that the “Delaware business trust statute demonstrates that the states are
approaching full-fledged recognition of the contract theory of the corporation”).
194. Trusts developed as common law devices and thus were not traditionally seen in civil
law countries. However, a growing number of civilian legal systems have adopted trust-like
instruments. See COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 4 (Michele Graziadei et al. eds., 2009); Strong, supra note 79, at 1159 n.1.
195. See Ossip, supra note 117, at 2332.
196. See In re Kenneth Allen Knight Tr., 303 F.3d 671, 676 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Universal
Clearing House Co., 60 B.R. 985, 991 (D. Utah 1986); In re Metro Palms I Tr., 153 B.R. 922, 923
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Hemex Liquidation Tr., 129 B.R. 91, 97–98 (Bankr. W.D. La.
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contexts as well.197 Thus, it can be argued that if the primary purpose of
the trust is to conduct a for-profit business, as is the case with commercial
trusts,198 then that entity should be treated as akin to a corporation,
another for-profit entity, for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.199
While this approach could be criticized as inefficient and potentially
unpredictable to the extent it would require courts to undertake a caseby-case analysis, the distinction between a trust created on a for-profit
basis and a trust that is created to hold and maintain personal property
appears relatively clear.200
Other analytical paradigms also exist. For example, it might be
possible to construct a theory of trust law that focuses on an entity’s
governance structure and the way in which the entity interacts with its
surroundings (i.e., its exogenous effect).201 This type of functional
approach suggests a strong correlation between commercial trusts and
corporations, based on the way in which the two types of business
organizations operate in the marketplace.202
2. Corporations
Like trusts, corporations are subject to a variety of theoretical
constructs.203 Theorization of corporation law is somewhat more mature
than that of trust law and includes a number of sub-specialties focusing
on different aspects of corporate practice.204 The most relevant paradigm
1991); In re Medallion Realty Tr., 103 B.R. 8, 11–12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Treasure
Island Land Tr., 2 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (2016); David
S. Jennis & Kathleen L. DiSanto, Trust or Debtor: You Decide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2013,
at 34, 34. Other bankruptcy courts adopt a balancing test that considers whether the trust has a
business purpose, title is held by a trustee, management is carried out in a centralized manner, the
trust’s continuity would be uninterrupted by the death of a beneficial owner, the trust’s interests
are transferable, and the trust allows for limited liability. See Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344,
359–60 (1935); Jennis & DiSanto, supra, at 34; see also Swanson v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 362, 365
(1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert
Assocs., 296 U.S. 369, 374 (1935).
197. See Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 327–28 (considering the purpose of commercial trusts).
198. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247 (“[T]he business trust is organized not as a means
of effecting a gift or transfer but as a device for profit making through the combination of capital
contributed by a number of investors.”).
199. See Ossip, supra note 117, at 2332–33.
200. See id.
201. See Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 327.
202. See supra Section II.A.
203. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 3–4; Millon, supra note 180, at 201
(discussing the historical evolution of theories of the corporation, including the artificial entity
theory, the natural entity theory and the aggregate theory).
204. For example, some commentators speak of the “contractarian” theory of corporations,
which refers to the corporation’s freedom to enter into various contracts. See Matheson & Olson,
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for the current analysis involves the various bases for corporate
personhood, which include
(i) the concession or “artificial entity” theory, which sees the
corporation as a creation of the state or sovereign that grants
its charter; (ii) the aggregate theory, which sees the
corporation as a fictional construct representing the sum of
its shareholders, managers, and other constituencies who
contribute to the success of the corporate enterprise; and (iii)
the real entity view, which sees the corporation, not as an
extension of the state or of its many constituencies, but as
having a separate identity independent of both.205
Although more research should, of course, be done, each of these
theories appears easily applicable to commercial trusts. For example, the
artificial entity theory, which is commonly associated with the jurist
Friedrich Carl von Savigny despite earlier connections to Roman,
English, and American law, holds that
because legal persons could only have recognized rights and
duties as a consequence of an act of the State, they were
nothing but artificial beings or fictions. . . . [D]ue to its
artificial personality, a firm could only have a very limited
set of rights and duties, namely those pertaining to
property.206
Although this theory has been called into question by contemporary
corporate law scholars, it still carries some weight in the academic
community.207 Notably, the artificial entity theory can be used to describe
commercial trusts, which are also subject to various legal restrictions and
focus primarily on matters relating to the use and disposition of
property.208
The second means of conceptualizing corporate personhood is the
aggregate theory, which characterizes a legal entity’s legal rights and
duties as indirect or derivative in nature and holds that the rights and
obligations of the shareholders or other individuals that make up the

supra note 40, at 32; Ribstein, supra note 182, at 84. However, those inquiries are not directly
relevant to the current discussion, since they focus on a single aspect of corporate practice.
205. Ho, supra note 49, at 891–92 (footnote omitted). These paradigms are most appropriate
for this study because the current analysis focuses on questions of citizenship—an issue that is
closely related to personhood—for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
206. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function,
118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
207. See id. at 14.
208. See id.; see also supra Subsection I.B.2.
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entity are coextensive with the legal entity itself.209 Like the artificial
entity theory, the aggregate theory has been criticized, although it retains
a number of adherents.210 Furthermore, this theory can be used to explain
commercial trusts, particularly given the way in which trusts split
ownership of the trust res into legal and equitable title.211 Only by
combining those two interests can a court truly appreciate the nature of
the trust’s rights and responsibilities.
The last of the traditional theories of the corporation, the real entity
theory, has been credited with promoting the development of a number
of different concepts in corporate law, including limited liability of
corporations, tortious and limited criminal liability of corporations, and
the corporate tax regime.212 Commentators have also relied on the real
entity theory to justify corporate claims to various constitutional rights,
including “freedom of the press, commercial speech, and protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, among others.”213 While
some of these issues have not yet been considered in the context of
commercial trusts, courts have held that a number of these principles—
most notably limited liability, tortious and criminal liability, and freedom
of speech—apply to commercial trusts, thereby suggesting a theoretical
coalescence between corporations and commercial trusts.214
As popular as these three paradigms have been, they have been largely
replaced by the nexus of contracts theory, which is now the dominant
theoretical construct in contemporary corporation law.215 The nexus of
contracts theory adopts a functional approach to the question of corporate
identity and frames the corporation as the aggregate of “various explicit
209. See Petrin, supra note 206, at 10.
210. See id. at 14–15.
211. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
212. See Petrin, supra note 206, at 11–13.
213. Id. at 13.
214. See 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(B)(1) (West 2016) (defining a person as
including a business trust for purposes of the criminal code); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (stating the First Amendment does not allow Congress to
limit speech “based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political
speech”); United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999) (involving a criminal
conviction of a commercial trust for conspiracy to defraud the government); DeRosier v. 5931
Bus. Tr., 870 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D. Minn. 1994) (featuring a commercial trust as a defendant in
a trademark infringement action).
215. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1998); Petrin, supra note
206, at 33; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11
(1976) (first establishing the theory). This paradigm is slightly different than the “contractarian”
theory of corporations, which refers to the corporation’s freedom to enter into various contracts.
See Matheson & Olson, supra note 40, at 32.
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and implicit contracts between the firm’s constituencies.”216 As such, the
nexus of contracts theory bears certain similarities to earlier theories of
the corporation.217
The nexus of contracts theory has been widely embraced by the
corporate law community and particularly by adherents of the law and
economics movement.218 However, the theory has been challenged on
various grounds.219 For example, the nexus of contracts theory is said to
be “unsatisfactory as a positive—that is, descriptive—matter, in part
because the corporation has a dual nature: In one aspect, it consists of
reciprocal arrangements; in another, it is a bureaucratic hierarchy. The
nexus-of-contracts conception captures only one of these two aspects of
the corporation.”220
Although this criticism may be worrisome for corporate theorists, it
need not affect the current analysis, since the focus of this Section is on
whether and to what extent commercial trusts can be considered
analogous to corporations as a matter of theory. Regardless of whether
the nexus of contracts theory is characterized as unitary or binary in
nature, the concept of a business entity that consists of “a nexus of
reciprocal arrangements” can also be used to describe commercial
trusts.221 Furthermore, some of the other problems with the nexus of
contracts theory cannot be said to apply to commercial trusts.
For example, the nexus of contract theory has experienced certain
theoretical difficulties in the corporate context regarding the applicability
of mandatory rules of law.222 For example, some commentators seeking
to justify the nexus of contracts theory have attempted to argue that
corporations are not generally subject to certain mandatory rules of
law.223 Setting aside whether the inapplicability of mandatory rules of law
can even be said to be central to the nexus of contract theory (something
216. Petrin, supra note 206, at 34.
217. See id.
218. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 819.
219. See id. at 820.
220. Id. at 819; see also Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 522
(2005) (“[C]orporate law never comes down one way or the other on whether the modern
corporation is a public entity (hence a social actor) or a purely private entity (and hence an
economic relationship).”).
221. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 822–24 (noting that this formulation may be somewhat
inaccurate, despite its prevalence); see also infra note 351 and accompanying text (noting
commercial trusts’ responsiveness to market forces).
222. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 823–24; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and
Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995)).
223. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 823.
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that Professor Melvin Eisenberg doubts),224 commercial trusts are
commonly considered to be much more flexible than corporations, which
suggests they suffer less than corporations with respect to this aspect of
the nexus of contracts theory.225
Scholars have also struggled with the way in which the nexus of
contracts theory conceives of shareholders as only holding a contractual
claim against the corporation rather than as acting as owners of the
corporation.226 However, commercial trusts have far fewer difficulties in
this regard, since legal title to the trust property is vested in the trustees
rather than in the shareholder-beneficiaries, who simply hold a breach of
trust (similar in this regard to a breach of contract) claim against the
trustees.227 Indeed, when discussing this issue in the corporate context,
Professor Eisenberg specifically mentions Professor Tony Honoré’s
example of “split ownership” as exemplifying the nexus of contracts
theory,228 which of course accords nicely with standard principles of trust
law.229
Another criticism of the nexus of contracts theory involves the notion
that “a corporation . . . is not only a hierarchical organization; it is a
bureaucratic hierarchical organization. That means, among other things,
that much of the activity in a corporation is organized by established
bureaucratic rules that are not open to continued reexamination, let alone
negotiation.”230 While this issue may be problematic for corporations,
commercial trusts experience few difficulties in this regard, since
commercial trusts are much more flexible than corporations with respect
to questions of corporate governance and can therefore be said to be more
amenable to amendment of their internal rules.231

224. See id.
225. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
226. See Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 825.
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS §§ 93, 95, 100 (AM. LAW INST. 2001). In a
corporation, the assets of the corporation are held by the corporation itself. See 3 TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 19:4 (database updated Dec. 2016) (describing the classificaton of
assets owned by a corporation).
228. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 825–26 (citing A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)); see also supra notes 81–85 and
accompanying text (describing the standard principles of trust law).
229. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing the standard principles of
trust law).
230. Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 829; see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1641 (2001) (advancing a theory of the firm according to which the firm’s boundary
is determined pursuant to whether it is efficient to structure behavior according to non-legally
enforceable rules and standards as opposed to contract and third party rules).
231. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
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The nexus of contracts theory is often used to describe a single
corporate unit.232 However, corporations do not always operate as
singular entities. Instead, several corporate entities may work together as
part of a unified commercial endeavor,233 a feature that they share with
commercial trusts.234 As a result, it is necessary to consider whether and
to what extent commercial trusts fall within theoretical constructs
describing corporate groups.
Corporate groups are often described pursuant to either the enterprise
theory or the entity theory.235 The enterprise theory “views all of the legal
entities that comprise the corporate group as part of a single economic
organization, while the entity view emphasize[s] the separate legal
identity of the affiliates that together form the corporate group.”236
Notably, both paradigms can easily be used to describe groups of
commercial trusts.
Professor Virginia Harper Ho has considered how the entity theory
and enterprise theory correlate with the three traditional theories of
corporate personhood discussed above (i.e., the concession theory, the
aggregate theory, and the real entity theory)237 and sought to correlate
these individual theories with the two standard theories of corporate
groups (i.e., the entity theory and the enterprise theory).238 Not only was
she successful in integrating these two different lines of thought regarding
corporate personhood, but her approach—which she reflected visually in
the form of a two-dimensional chart—can be adapted for use with
commercial trusts as well.239 Thus, a theoretical construct of the
personhood of commercial trusts, based on standard corporate law
theories, might be reflected as follows.

232. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 819.
233. This often happens in the capital market and asset securitization contexts. See Kantor,
supra note 98, at 16–22.
234. See id. (noting how a single transaction can involve multiple related trust vehicles).
235. See Ho, supra note 49, at 897–98 (noting that these theories were initially developed in
the context of tort and statutory liability).
236. Id. at 898. One commentator has claimed that commercial trusts should be considered
singular entities, given that they can operate on a nationwide basis. See Christy, supra note 11, at
151.
237. See supra notes 204–14 and accompanying text.
238. See Ho, supra note 49, at 902 (creating a chart for analysis of corporate personhood).
239. See id.
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Theories of Commercial Trusts in Two Dimensions240
Entity approach
Concession Commercial trusts are
Theory
created solely by operation
of state law.

Enterprise approach
Commercial trusts are
allowed to operate across state
or national borders and thus
are subject to multiple laws.
Aggregate Commercial trusts are
Commercial trusts are
Theory
fictional constructs
fictional constructs
representing the sum of the representing numerous
interests of the
individual interests of the
beneficiaries.
beneficiaries.
Real Entity Commercial trusts have a Commercial trusts’ identities
Theory
separate identity greater
reflect the disparate views of
than the sum of their
the individual beneficiaries.
individual beneficiaries.
As the above discussion shows, commercial trusts can easily fall
within most if not all of the primary theoretical constructs relating to
corporations. These theoretical similarities, combined with the many
functional similarities between the two business forms,241 strongly
suggest that Congress should treat the two entities the same way in
questions relating to diversity jurisdiction unless there is some procedural
reason to distinguish between the two types of business associations. That
issue is considered in the next Part.
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Americold is consistent with
conventional wisdom suggesting that the Court is seeking to reduce the
federal judicial caseload by limiting the number of cases that qualify for
diversity jurisdiction.242 To some extent, the Court’s efforts appear to
have been successful, based on statistics indicating that the number of
cases relying on diversity jurisdiction dropped by 17% between 2014 and

240. The following chart is an adaptation—focused on the personhood of commercial trusts
rather than personhood of corporations—of Professor Ho’s chart analyzing corporate personhood.
See id.
241. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting the functional equivalence of
two business forms); Miller, supra note 7, at 448; Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 560; Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 31.
242. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1015–17 (2016);
Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13, at 300–04 (discussing various ways that federal courts interpret
and apply rules regarding complete diversity so as to restrict access to federal courts).
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2015.243 Although this Article does not take a position on whether
decreasing diversity jurisdiction is wise as a general proposition,244 it
does seem that commercial trusts should be exempt from those initiatives
for a variety of practical and theoretical reasons.245 This conclusion
derives not only as a matter of trust and corporation law but also as a
matter of procedural law.
In many ways, Americold appears to be a routine procedural decision
that applies equally to all potential parties.246 Under the Supreme Court’s
current ruling, no one—neither the trustees, the shareholder-beneficiaries
nor anyone suing the trust—will likely be able to establish complete
diversity and reap the benefits of federal court absent some sort of federal
question.247 This result will often arise by virtue of the sheer number of
shareholder-beneficiaries found in many commercial trusts.248 However,
difficulties can also arise in cases involving smaller trusts, since “the trust
may not have information as to its ultimate beneficial owners, much less
information as to their citizenship.”249
Although Americold can be said to reflect a type of formal neutrality
among potential parties,250 this quality does not necessarily save the
decision when it is considered in light of the original purpose of diversity
243. See Federal Judicial Center Caseload Statistics 2015, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015 (last visited
June 30, 2017) (noting that, in 2015, 87,772 cases out of a total of 281,608 civil disputes relied
on diversity jurisdiction). But see Purcell, supra note 3, at 1845 (suggesting that statistical data
has actually “had relatively little impact on the rules of federal jurisdiction”). However, the
number of cases involving diversity jurisdiction were still 41% greater in 2015 than in 2006. See
Federal Judicial Center Caseload Statistics 2015, supra. These figures are particularly salient to
the current discussion, given data suggesting that corporations constitute a significant proportion
of the diversity cases heard in federal court. See Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability
Companies for Diversity Jurisdiction, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 437 nn.6–7 (2002).
244. Other commentators have addressed this issue at length. See C. Douglas Floyd, The
Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 694 (2004); Rodney K. Miller, Article III and
Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete Diversity Rule and a Proposed Return to
Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 278 (2012) (suggesting return to a rule of minimal
diversity for diversity jurisdiction).
245. See supra Part II.
246. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014.
247. See id. at 1016; Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 104. While some types of suits
might still be able to proceed under Navarro, that rule is somewhat in doubt given the discussion
in Americold. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1016; Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 100 S. Ct. 1779,
1789–90 (1980). At the very least, significant litigation will arise to define the circumstances in
which Navarro applies. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
248. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
249. Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 104 (noting this issue may be particularly acute
in certain types of disputes, such as those involving structured financing); see also Sitkoff, supra
note 7, at 34 (noting that commercial trusts are “widely used in structured finance transactions”).
250. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 6

1060

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

jurisdiction.251 As Justice Joseph Story explained in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,252 the Framers did not intend diversity jurisdiction “to be
exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs,
and would elect the national forum, but also for the protection of
defendants who might be entitled to try their rights, or assert their
privileges, before the same forum.”253 The Supreme Court relied on this
rationale in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,254 when it held that
corporations could not deprive their opponents of the constitutional right
to have their disputes heard in federal court simply by eliminating
diversity through the election of corporate directors from every U.S.
state.255
Although Martin and Marshall were decided in the mid-nineteenth
century, concerns about rules that allow or require the virtual elimination
of diversity jurisdiction are just as relevant today.256 For example, the
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the problems associated with
overly restrictive approaches to diversity jurisdiction in 2010 in Hertz
Corp. v. Friend,257 when it noted that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction
was to increase access to the federal courts.258 Although Hertz
acknowledged the need to limit excessive federal litigation, the decision
also recognized that, in 1951, a special committee of the Judicial
Conference had cited “a general need ‘to prevent fraud and abuses’ with
respect to federal jurisdiction” and had suggested corporations be
considered citizens not only of the state in which they were incorporated
but also citizens of the place where the corporation had its principal place

251. See id. at 1014, 1015.
252. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
253. Id. at 348; see also Christy, supra note 11, at 151 (discussing this issue in the context
of commercial trusts).
254. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
255. See id. at 328. Marshall was the last in a trilogy of cases dealing with corporate
citizenship prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1);
Marshall, 57 U.S. at 328; Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497, 558 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston R.R., 43 U.S. at 497; Oh, supra note 4, at 421–22.
256. See Marshall, 57 U.S. at 328; Martin, 14 U.S. at 304. Some commentators have
suggested that such a rule is necessary to preserve states’ rights, see Ossip, supra note 117, at
2331, but that perspective appears to ignore the purpose and history of diversity jurisdiction. See
Jesse M. Cross, National “Harmony”: An Inter-Branch Constitutional Principle and Its
Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 93 NEB. L. REV. 139, 155–57 (2014).
257. 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
258. See id. at 86; see also Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99 (discussing questions of
corporate citizenship after Hertz).
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of business.259 In 1958, this recommendation was adopted by Congress
in slightly modified form and is now reflected in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1).260
While the Court, Congress, and the Judicial Conference have
considered citizenship of corporations in various contexts, these bodies
have not engaged in the same degree of debate about citizenship of
commercial trusts. However, it may be time to do so, since, as the
following Subsections show, the rule in Americold gives rise to a
significant number of theoretical and practical problems as a matter of
procedural law and practice.261
A. Theoretical Issues
Although diversity jurisdiction has been routinely criticized for
several decades, the mechanism nevertheless continues to provide an
important means of access to the federal courts.262 Over the years,
diversity jurisdiction has been rationalized on a variety of different
grounds,263 and Congress should keep these rationales in mind when
considering the legislative proposals contained herein.264
259. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 86 (citing REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGULAR
ANNUAL MEETING AND SPECIAL MEETING (Sept. 24–26 & Mar. 19–20, 1951), H.R. DOC. NO. 365,
at 14 (2d Sess. 1952)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). For varying views on the history
of diversity jurisdiction, see Bassett, supra note 3, at 122–31; Cooper & Nielson, supra note 13,
at 295–98; Cross, supra note 256, at 155–57; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 492 (1928); Deidre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The
Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477
(2015); Wood, supra note 17, at 593. For a history of alienage jurisdiction as distinguished from
diversity jurisdiction, see Oh, supra note 4, at 440–41.
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 88.
261. Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
262. See Cross, supra note 256, at 152–54; Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 411 (1906), reprinted in
40 AM. L. REV. 729, 744–45 (1906); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1833–35 (noting some academics
believe that diversity jurisdiction is indefensible as a matter of legal theory); Sharon E. Rush,
Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L.
REV. 119, 136 (2014). In 1990, a Congressional report concluded that “[i]n most diversity
cases . . . there is no substantial need for a federal forum.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 (1990); see also Larry Kramer, Diversity
Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98. However, the Committee “strongly recommend[ed]”
the elimination of diversity jurisdiction, save for “complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and
suits involving aliens.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra, at 38–39. Notably, the debate
about eliminating or curtailing diversity jurisdiction “has left alienage jurisdiction unscathed,”
which is an important feature, given the significant number of commercial trusts with actual or
potential international contacts. Oh, supra note 4, at 439; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155,
161 and accompanying text.
263. Cross, supra note 256, at 155–57.
264. See id. at 146 (noting the importance of theory to legislative practice).
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Any analysis of diversity jurisdiction begins with the text contained
in the Constitution265 and the First Judiciary Act,266 as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in cases such as Strawbridge v. Curtiss267 and Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux.268 In the latter decision, Chief Justice John
Marshall recognized that diversity jurisdiction was not only meant to
avoid actual bias by state court judges against parties from other
jurisdictions but was also intended to eliminate potential and perceived
biases.269 This approach focuses on the facilitation of interstate and
international commerce “by reassuring wary parties that interstate
activities or transactions will not subject them to suits in state courts that
might be infected with local bias.”270
This theory is clearly relevant to cases involving commercial trusts,
given the national and international nature of many commercial trusts and
the role that commercial trusts play in the U.S. and global economies.271
Given the competitive nature of interstate and international commerce,
Congress should be cautious about any jurisdictional rule, including the
one enunciated in Americold, that affects (or is believed to affect) the fair,
efficient and neutral resolution of disputes involving a particular type of
commercial organization, since that can diminish parties’ willingness to
do business in a particular location.272
Another theory involving diversity jurisdiction arose as a result of the
United States’ increasing participation in international affairs.273 Under
this view, diversity jurisdiction, broadly defined to include alienage
jurisdiction, was justified as a means of ensuring foreign parties’ access
265. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
266. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. 73, 78–80 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1830.
267. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
268. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
269. See Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 67, 87; Cross, supra note 256, at 148–49; Friendly, supra note
259, at 492.
270. Cross, supra note 256, at 149; see also Rush, supra note 262, at 157 (noting concerns
that a state court “judge ‘will find a way,’ perhaps unwittingly, to rule in favor of the resident”).
Concerns about bias are particularly pressing given that so many state court judges are subject to
election, either initially or through confirmation elections. See id. at 159; Wood, supra note 17, at
599; see also infra note 288 (regarding judicial elections).
271. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text.
272. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Donald Earl
Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of
Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2015) (noting “domestic and foreign courts
compete through domestic and foreign law, both substantive and procedural, to regulate
transnational activities as part of a transnational law market”); see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
273. See Cross, supra note 256, at 149.
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to federal courts and thereby facilitating foreign relations.274 While this
theory originally developed in the context of federal habeas corpus
actions,275 it remains relevant in a world that is increasingly focused on
promoting and protecting international trade.276
Although this second theory appears somewhat similar to the first, the
foreign relations rationale focuses on the difficulties that can and do arise
when a foreign country believes its citizens and corporations are being
mistreated in U.S. courts.277 This theory is particularly relevant to cases
involving commercial trusts, which can involve business that operate on
a national and international basis.278 Furthermore, many commercial
trusts involve industries—such as capital markets, pensions and
international insurance and reinsurance—that carry significant public
policy implications, which may increase foreign states’ concerns about
fair and equitable treatment in U.S. courts.279 If a foreign nation does not
feel that it and its citizens are being respected in U.S. courts, that country
may take action, diplomatically280 or statutorily.281

274. See id.; Michael G. Collins, Comment, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute,
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 649, 681–85 (2002); Oh, supra note 4, at 437 (noting alienage jurisdiction
focuses on “preserving foreign relations; the necessity of guarding against xenophobic sentiments,
whether actual or perceived; and the values of facilitating trade” (footnotes omitted)).
275. See Collins, supra note 274, at 681–85.
276. The nature and limits of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction have become
increasingly problematic over the last few decades.
277. See supra notes 269–70.
278. See Cross, supra note 256, at 151; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 159–64 and
accompanying text.
279. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
280. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of U.S. courts sought to extend the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, leading to a variety of foreign relations concerns, as
expressed in diplomatic notes from the United Kingdom and Germany. See GARY B. BORN &
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing the Laker Airways cases); Stephen D. Piraino, Note, A Prescription for Excess: Using
Prescriptive Comity to Limit the Extraterritorial Reach of the Sherman Act, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1099, 1120–21 (2012). Indeed, Germany insisted on a special international accord to harmonize
its efforts to address international trade violations and put the issue to rest. See Antitrust Accord,
U.S-Germany, June 23, 1976, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/internationalantitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/agree_germany.pdf. These issues
continue to be raised. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)
(discussing the extraterritorial reach of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)); Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167–68 (2004) (discussing
amicus briefs from Canada, Germany and Japan regarding the extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act).
281. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 152 (2009) (discussing a variety of blocking statutes, including the
Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980 (U.K.), which the United Kingdom adopted in response
to the Laker Airways cases).
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A third theory posits that diversity jurisdiction was founded on the
need to alleviate concerns that foreign and out-of-state commercial
actors, particularly creditors, will be disadvantaged in state court.282
Some commentators distinguish this theory from the two preceding ones
on the grounds that this proposition focuses on matters relating to the
application of substantive state laws rather than concerns about emotion
or prejudice on the part of the decision-maker.283
This third theory also augurs in favor of facilitating diversity
jurisdiction in cases involving commercial trusts. Commercial trusts
often include choice of law provisions284 that could create problems for
the parties if state court judges fail to respect those provisions or interpret
them properly.285 This concern may be particularly pronounced in crossborder cases governed by foreign law.286
A fourth rationale supporting diversity jurisdiction involves the real
or perceived superiority of the federal bench.287 While critics of diversity
jurisdiction have claimed that few differences actually exist between state
and federal courts, a number of empirical studies have suggested that the
choice of forum can be outcome determinative.288 Even if the empirical
research on this issue is flawed, it is widely accepted that “many
procedures, regardless of the motives behind their adoption, inevitably
influence who brings suits, the value of settlement, and often the results
at trial or by forced termination before trial.”289 Thus, the perception of
the federal courts as being superior to state courts in terms of both
282. See Bassett, supra note 3, at 133; Cross, supra note 256, at 151.
283. See Bassett, supra note 3, at 132–33; Rush, supra note 262, at 124 (defining bias as “a
shared ‘ideology’ based on a shared geography between a litigant and his or her home state
judge”).
284. The flexibility of trust law generally supports the use of choice of law provisions, which
could lead to a disconnect between the place where the dispute is heard and the law governing the
dispute. See also infra Subsection III.B.3. Federal courts are more familiar with matters governed
by foreign substantive law and thus may be more likely to respect choice of law provisions. See
Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the
Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 892–93, 97 (2011).
285. Commentators have noted that many judges ignore choice of law provisions so as to
rely on local law. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Determining and Applying Foreign Law: The Increasing
Need for Cross-Border Cooperation, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1081, 1091 (2013).
286. See id. at 1081. The internal affairs of trusts doing business in foreign jurisdictions are
typically governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the trust was formed. See Rutledge &
Habbart, supra note 15, at 1095.
287. See Cross, supra note 256, at 154; see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (1977) [hereinafter Neuborne, Myth]; Burt Neuborne, Parity
Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995).
288. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 607; Cross, supra note 256, at 154. But see
Bassett, supra note 3, at 140–41 (challenging the legitimacy of empirical studies in this area).
289. See Subrin, supra note 164, at 2152.
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procedure and judicial independence will influence party behavior
regardless of whether there is any ascertainable difference in outcome.290
At this point, commercial actors organizing ventures as commercial
trusts have few means of avoiding the rule in Americold other than to exit
the U.S. judicial system entirely through arbitration, choice of law or
choice of forum provisions, or decisions relating to the place and type of
business organization.291 While it is unclear whether the virtual
elimination of diversity jurisdiction will drive parties to adopt one or
more of these defensive mechanisms, it is a possibility that must be
considered. Furthermore, the significance of commercial trusts to the
U.S. economy suggests that this is not an issue that Congress should take
lightly.292
The fifth and final justification for diversity jurisdiction involves the
use of the federal judicial system to promote “harmony and proper
intercourse among the States.”293 This principle can be explained in both
290. See Neuborne, Myth, supra note 287, at 1120–21; Rush, supra note 262, at 159–60.
Judicial independence is often tied to the life tenure of the federal bench. The situation is quite
different in state courts. At this point,
twenty-two states use contested judicial elections to select their judges, with
seven states holding partisan elections and fifteen using non-partisan elections,
i.e., elections in which the party affiliation of the candidates is not shown on the
ballot. Thirteen states use some form of the Missouri Plan, named for the state
that first adopted this form of “merit” selection. The remaining fifteen states
employ some variation of the federal model, mixing executive appointment with
some form of legislative confirmation. And the experiment continues “in 2011,
[with] 26 states consider[ing] legislation to change or replace their judicial merit
selection systems.”
Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts’ Court’s Proper Support of Judicial
Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (citation omitted) (noting “[c]onventional wisdom”
that “the experiment with judicial elections has failed”). The United States appears to be the only
jurisdiction in the world to select its judges through popular election. The only other countries to
include an electoral element to judicial selection are Switzerland, which appoints judges through
election by the Federal Assembly, and Japan, which allows judges to be removed from the bench
through a referendum. See JAPAN CONST., arts. 78–79, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/
itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/constitution_e.htm;
Benjamin
Suter,
Appointment,
Discipline and Removal of Judges: A Comparison of the Swiss and New Zealand Judiciaries, 46
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 267, 280 (2015); Sher Watts Spooner, Why Does America Elect
Judges, Anyway?, DAILY KOS (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/3/6/
1489191/-Why-does-America-elect-judges-anyway.
291. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); see also infra
notes 300–57 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text.
293. Cross, supra note 256 at 157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 235 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1990)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 445–46 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1990). But see Bassett, supra note 3, at 119 (claiming that diversity
jurisdiction actually hinders national harmony by promoting regional biases).
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commercial terms (as illustrated by the work of Professor Akhil Amar)
and social terms (as demonstrated by the writing of Professor Jack
Balkin).294 Judge Diane Wood has echoed these sentiments, noting that
“diversity jurisdiction has existed as one tool for assuring a national
approach to national problems that happen to be governed by state
law.”295 Thus, diversity jurisdiction can be conceived of as an important
means of “prevent[ing] state boundaries from impeding judicial efforts to
dispose of controversies in the most fair and efficient manner
possible.”296
Although commercial trusts are largely governed by state law (a
feature that is shared by corporations), they operate on a national basis
and play a large and increasing role in both the national and international
economies.297 As such, there appears to be good reason for federal courts
to have jurisdiction over disputes involving commercial trusts, as is the
case with disputes involving corporations.298
As the preceding discussion shows, all of the theories used to justify
diversity jurisdiction support extending the rule to include commercial
trust disputes. While this analysis may be sufficient to convince some
legislators to override Americold, Congress need not rely on theoretical
concerns.299 Instead, there are a number of highly persuasive practical
arguments in favor of statutory reform, as discussed in the next
Subsection.
B. Practical Issues
Traditionally, arguments against diversity jurisdiction have focused
on the malleability of the device and its lack of jurisprudential
cohesiveness, which is said to result in improper judicial and corporate
strategizing.300 These features have also made diversity jurisdiction
appear “dubious to general theorists and those interested in systemic
judicial efficiency.”301 However, trial lawyers and corporate counsel have
consistently defended the mechanism as “an exceptionally useful tactical
294. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005); Jack M.
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2010); Cross, supra note 256, at 170.
295. Wood, supra note 17, at 605.
296. Cross, supra note 256, at 186.
297. See Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 317, 320 (2009) (noting “the majority of American corporations are chartered under
state law”); Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 15, at 1055; see also supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155,
161 and accompanying text.
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
299. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
300. See Purcell, supra note 3, at 1839.
301. Id.
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tool” that provides them with a much-desired federal forum.302 As a
result, the contemporary debate about diversity jurisdiction often focuses
more on pragmatic rather than theoretical concerns.303 Indeed, Professor
Purcell has noted that over the last few years, the discussion about
jurisdiction has become
more closely intertwined not just with issues of institutional
structure and federal-state relations but also with issues of
private economic conflict and public social policy. More
particularly, reform efforts [have become] increasingly
intertwined with what might be called “litigation-generated”
issues, that is, issues that arose not from traditional structural
or institutional conflicts but from pervasive and socially
resonant patterns of litigation, especially the rapidly
escalating number of cases that pitted national corporations
against a wide variety of claimants—suppliers, customers,
employees, and adversely affected third parties.304
The most recent example of this new approach to jurisdictional
analysis can be seen in the debates involving the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA), which addressed “practical problems that were both
weighty and pressing.”305 Though CAFA resembled existing models of
jurisdictional reform in some regards, the statute was unusual in the way
it increased, rather than restricted, diversity jurisdiction and “opened new
vistas for the expanded and highly flexible use of [diversity] jurisdiction
by exploiting its two most potentially powerful instrumental
characteristics: its nearly illimitable plasticity and its precise targeting
capability.”306 Although CAFA is not the only federal statute to embrace
the concept of minimum (rather than complete) diversity,307 CAFA is said
to have “strengthened the legitimacy of such a potentially vast and pliable
protective jurisdiction with its original constitutional justification,”
thereby bringing practical considerations back into line with legal
theory.308
302. Id. at 1838.
303. See id. at 1825.
304. Id. at 1828.
305. See id. at 1851.
306. Id. at 1857.
307. The same technique was used in matters involving interpleader and multiparty,
multiforum matters. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335(a)(1), 1369 (2012); Purcell, supra note 3, at 1856.
Some commentators have called for the adoption of minimal diversity in all cases. See Miller,
supra note 244, at 269.
308. Purcell, supra note 3, at 1859; see also Cross, supra note 256, at 146; Miller, supra note
244, at 279. But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1523–24 (2008) (noting constitutional
arguments against CAFA); C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce
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The preceding suggests that Congress needs to evaluate the practical
implications of Americold when considering whether and to what extent
a legislative response is appropriate.309 Among the prospects that
Congress must consider are the likelihood that the rule from Americold
will cause parties to exit the U.S. judicial system through arbitration
agreements or through forum selection clauses, choice of law provisions
or the place of organization.310 Alternatively, parties could reject
commercial trusts in favor of other types of business associations, most
notably corporations. Each of these possibilities are analyzed in the
following Subsections.
1. Exit Through Arbitration
One of the most popular and effective ways for parties to avoid an
unwelcome judicial forum is through arbitration. This route may be
particularly attractive to U.S. parties, given the strong pro-arbitration
policy reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and most state
arbitration statutes.311
Interestingly, there has never been a better time for parties to seek
arbitration of commercial trust disputes.312 Not only have five states
(Arizona, Florida, Missouri, New Hampshire, and South Dakota) recently
enacted statutes specifically providing for the enforcement of arbitration

Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006); Floyd, supra
note 244, at 613. Though the term is not well defined,
[t]he concept of protective jurisdiction tends to arise in situations in which
Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted minimum requirements
for a case to arise under federal law are not met, and no other basis for federal
jurisdiction can be found under article III of the Constitution. Since Congress has
necessarily concluded in such instances that a federal forum is desired in order
to promote some federal interest, the federal jurisdiction is characterized as
“protective” of that interest.
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 542, 546–47 (1983).
309. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
310. See id. at 1016–17.
311. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012); Nitro-Lift Tech., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501
(2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). It is unclear whether and to what extent the FAA preempts state
arbitration statutes in trust-related disputes. See David Horton, Donative Trusts and the United
States Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 203, 203–27 (focusing on non-commercial trusts but
discussing factors that may be persuasive in the commercial context).
312. See S.I. Strong, The Future of Trust Arbitration: Quo Vadis? in ARBITRATION OF TRUST
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 531, 546.
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provisions in trust instruments,313 but some types of commercial trust
disputes are statutorily required to be resolved through arbitration.314
Support for trust arbitration has also been seen in judicial quarters, with
a number of U.S. courts, most notably the Supreme Court of Texas,
judicially recognizing the arbitrability of internal trust disputes even in
cases without a specific statute on trust arbitration.315
Trust arbitration has spread to other countries as well. Not only have
key offshore jurisdictions like Guernsey and the Bahamas explicitly
adopted legislation allowing for the arbitration of trust disputes, but
countries such as Switzerland have addressed the matter indirectly
through their conflict of laws provisions.316
As these examples suggest, the field of trust arbitration is expanding
rapidly.317 However, these developments do not exist in a vacuum.
313. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2016), applied in Jones v. Fink, 2011 WL
601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.2-205 (2016);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 564-B:1-111A (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-54 (2016); Lee-ford Tritt,
Legislative Approaches to Trust Arbitration in the United States, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 150, 159–71. Other
state statutes appear to permit the arbitration of trust disputes, although they have not yet been
tested. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1188–92.
314. See 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012) (referring to certain types of multiemployer pension
trusts); ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund v. Meredith Gray, Inc., 94 Fed. App’x 850, 852 (2d Cir. 2003);
Teamsters-Emp’rs Local 945 Pension Fund v. Waste Mgmt. N.J., Inc., No. 11-902 (FSH), 2011
WL 2173854, at *2 (D.N.J. 2011); S.I. Strong, Institutional Approaches to Trust Arbitration:
Comparing the AAA, ACTEC, ICC, and DIS Trust Arbitration Regimes, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST
DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 99, 137; INT’L FOUND.
OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, IMPARTIAL UMPIRE RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF IMPASSES BETWEEN
TRUSTEES OF JOINT EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUST FUNDS (effective Jan. 1, 1988),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Impartial%20Umpire%20Rules%20for%20Arbitration%2
0of%20Impasses%20Between%20Trustees%20of%20Joint%20Employee%20Benefit%20Trust
%20Funds.pdf; INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, MULTI-EMPLOYER PENSION PLAN
ARBITRATION RULES FOR WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY DISPUTES (rev’d effective Sept. 1, 1986),
http://www.lawmemo.com/arb/res/aaa-meppa.htm.
315. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013); see also Mary F. Radford, Trust
Arbitration in the United States Courts, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 175, 176–96 (discussing numerous state and federal
cases); Strong, supra note 79, at 1159–1248 (considering recent developments in the field of
international commercial arbitration).
316. See Private International Law Statute, chs. 9a, 12 (Switz.); Trustee Act of 1925, ch. 19,
pt. II, § 15(f) (Guernsey); Trustee (Amendment) Act 2011 § 18(2) (Bah.); Trusts (Guernsey) Law
2007 pt. II, § 63(1)(a) (Guernsey 2008); David Brownbill, Arbitration of Trust Disputes Under
the Bahamas Trustee Act 1998, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 313; Paul Buckle, Trust Arbitration in Guernsey, in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 77,
at 289; Strong, supra note 77, at 383, 392; Strong, supra note 79, at 1193–95.
317. A full discussion of the various issues is beyond the scope of the current Article,
although further reading is available. See ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL
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Indeed, similar initiatives are currently being considered in the corporate
context.318 The most important development arose in 2009, when the
German Federal Court of Justice declared shareholder disputes
arbitrable,319 but other countries have adopted analogous measures,
leading a number of major multinational corporations, most notably
Royal Dutch Shell, to adopt arbitration provisions in their corporate
documents.320 While the United States does not appear to be as far along
as these jurisdictions, a number of U.S. scholars have considered the
relationship between the FAA and arbitration provisions in corporate
bylaws and charters.321
These developments suggest an increasingly positive global
perspective on the arbitration of internal trust disputes, including those
involving commercial trusts.322 However, some problems do exist.
Perhaps the most disquieting involves the Security and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) unwritten but well-known policy of refusing to
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra

note 77, passim; S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal
Trust Disputes: Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices,
28 ARB. INT’L 591, 593 (2012); Strong, supra note 79, at 1157.
318. See Olivier Caprasse, Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes—Belgium and
France, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 79, 79–99 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al. eds., 2011); Gerard Meijer
& Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an Arbitration Clause in the Articles of
Association of a Company, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra, at 117, 117–51; Strong, supra note
317, at 592.
319. See ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] [Federal
Court of Justice] Apr. 6, 2009, II ZR 255/08 (Ger.), http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/
CommonUI/document.aspx?id=kli-ka-0945006; Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law
Disputes in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra note 318, at 55, 56. This decision led the
German Arbitral Institution (DIS) to adopt a special set of arbitral rules dedicated to the resolution
of internal shareholder disputes, including those relating to corporate governance. See DIS
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CORPORATE LAW DISPUTES § 1.1 (2009), http://www.disarb.de/download/DIS_SRCoLD_%202009_Download.pdf. These rules could easily be adapted
for use in internal trust disputes. See Strong, supra note 314, at 108–36; Strong, supra note 317,
at 637–49.
320. Royal Dutch Shell is an Anglo-Dutch company incorporated in the United Kingdom
and headquartered in the Netherlands. The company’s articles of association include an arbitration
agreement that constitutes “an express submission to arbitration by each shareholder, the
company, its directors and professional service providers.” ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF ROYAL
DUTCH SHELL PLC art. 138(A), (F) (adopted May, 18 2010), http://www.shell.com/media/newsand-media-releases/2012/cove-energy-02052012/_jcr_content/par/textimage.stream/144118062
9555/ce14642c7238f77a5c65f42f40313ded1809ceed6a3b629b527465ad63a7d00d/articles-ofassociation-shell.pdf; see also infra note 339 (discussing other provisions).
321. See Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 751, 773–75 (2015); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of
Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO L.J. 583, 600–03 (2016).
322. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 45 (noting desirability of arbitration of some types of
commercial trust disputes); Strong, supra note 312, at 540; Strong, supra note 79, at 1177–79
(noting commercial trusts are not donative in nature).
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provide accelerated registration for public offerings of equity securities
in cases where shareholder disputes are subject to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement.323 Although the scope of this rule is somewhat
unclear (for example, it is not known whether bonds and other debt
offerings are covered under the current policy),324 the SEC’s ban on
arbitration would clearly affect commercial trusts that are or might be
publicly traded at some point in the future.325 While industry groups have
occasionally sought to persuade the SEC to change its approach, those
efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.326
Arbitration of commercial trust disputes could also experience
difficulties as a matter of public policy. While U.S. courts have held that
arbitration is appropriate in a number of areas of public concern,327
opponents to arbitration of non-commercial trusts have asserted various
types of policy arguments, including those claiming exclusive
jurisdiction of probate or chancery courts over trust-related disputes and
those involving the application of various mandatory rules of law, such
as the law of succession.328 Although more research needs to be
conducted, it is possible that some of these objections could be applicable
to disputes involving commercial trusts.329 Furthermore, some types of
commercial trusts might be subject to their own unique policy concerns.
For example, the public nature of regulatory compliance trusts could
require disputes to be resolved in an entirely transparent (i.e., public)
manner.330
323. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 36; Carl W. Schneider, Arbitration Provisions in
Corporate Governance Documents, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2012),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/04/27/arbitration-provisions-in-corporate-governancedocuments/. Other difficulties exist, as in cases involving special purpose vehicles, which can
give rise to issues of consent, and situations involving non-exclusive choice of forum. See Kantor,
supra note 98, at 31–43.
324. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 37. Although the SEC policy does not apply to private
bond placements, parties often contemplate the possible resale of private bonds on the public
market, which often precludes the inclusion of an arbitration provision in the original documents.
See id.
325. See id.; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the number of publicly
traded REITs in August 2016).
326. See Kantor, supra note 98, at 37 (noting no judicial challenges have yet been brought
to determine the propriety of the policy or its scope).
327. Arbitration has been considered appropriate in such policy-laden fields as antitrust and
international insurance and reinsurance law. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985); Strong, supra note 161, at 287–88, 301.
328. See Strong, supra note 79, at 1200 n.204, 1234–35.
329. For example, even a commercial trust could run into difficulties regarding the law of
succession. See Regions Bank v. Britt, No. 4:09CV61TSL-LRA, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2 & n.2
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2009).
330. See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
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Arbitration therefore appears to provide parties with a possible means
of relief from the rule in Americold, although this option is not without
its difficulties.331 However, there are other ways for a party to evade an
undesirable judicial forum, as discussed in the following Subsection.
2. Exit Through Forum Selection Clauses, Choice of Law Provisions,
and Place of Organization
Another way for parties to avoid a particular judicial forum is through
a forum selection clause.332 These types of provisions are widely
recognized in U.S. courts, albeit with some limitations.333 For example,
parties cannot use a forum selection provision to create jurisdiction where
none would otherwise exist.334 As a result, parties cannot use a forum
selection clause to choose a U.S. federal court if subject matter
jurisdiction does not exist as a matter of federal or constitutional law.335
In the case of commercial trusts, parties might be inclined to use a
forum selection provision to choose a U.S. state or foreign court with
particular expertise in these types of disputes.336 However, that technique
331. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016–17 (2016).
332. Interestingly, forum selection provisions are routinely used in contracts between
companies but are seldom found in the founding documents of publicly traded corporations. See
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336–37 (2012). The incidence of forum selection
provisions in an entity’s organic documents is higher for limited liability companies and limited
liability partnerships than for corporations. See id. at 357. At this point, it is unclear which model
is more applicable to commercial trusts because the issue may turn on whether and to what extent
commercial trusts experience the same types of difficulties that corporations have with respect to
the time and manner of adoption of the forum selection clause. See id. at 390. Delaware recently
adopted a law allowing exclusive forum selection provisions for certain types of corporations,
which should lead to an increase in the use of such provisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115
(2016); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
333. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Distr. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568, 579, 581 (2013) (noting
strong federal policy in favor of enforcing forum selection provisions in the interstate context);
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding forum selection provisions are
enforceable unless unreasonable under the circumstances); Erin Ann O’Hara, The Jurisprudence
and Politics of Forum-Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 301, 301 (2002) (suggesting forum
selection clauses are most robustly enforced in international commercial cases). The United States
has signed the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (COCA), although ratification has not
yet occurred. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
334. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2014).
335. See id.
336. For example, Delaware or Massachusetts might be a favored location, given those
states’ expertise in corporate law and statutory trusts. The English Commercial Court also has an
excellent reputation in complex commercial matters. Other popular offshore jurisdictions include
Switzerland, Guernsey, Singapore, and the Cayman Islands.
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might require parties to make other procedural choices to allow the court
in question to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.337 For example, some
courts will hear any dispute governed by the law of that jurisdiction,
regardless of whether any other connections exist between that
jurisdiction and the parties or the dispute.338 However, parties may have
to choose to have the dispute governed by the law of the preferred forum
if they have no other connections to that jurisdiction.339
Other courts may require a more substantive connection between the
dispute and the jurisdiction. Thus, it may be necessary for a commercial
trust to be registered or organized under a particular state law or have its
primary place of business in a particular location if the parties want the
courts in that jurisdiction to hear a dispute arising out of the trust.340 This
approach can be interpreted as an implicit requirement that the parties
choose the law of the forum, since parties who choose to do business in
or organize themselves under a particular jurisdiction’s laws typically
make themselves subject to that law.341
This is not to say that a choice of forum provision necessarily requires
the parties to choose that jurisdiction’s substantive law to apply to the
merits of the dispute. The law of the forum and the law governing the
dispute do not always have to be the same.342 However, sophisticated
commercial actors recognize that courts do not always apply foreign law
correctly or readily, either in the interstate or the international context.343
337. For example, some states require certain types of disputes to be heard in their courts or
under their laws. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001(b) (West 2016).
338. For example, English courts will typically exercise jurisdiction over any dispute
governed by English law, even if the parties and the dispute have no other connection to England.
See ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS 10 (2016). New York has
adopted similar provisions in cases over a certain minimum amount. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§§ 5-1401 to 5-1402 (McKinney 2016); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to
New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1484–85 (2009).
339. Royal Dutch Shell has adopted this type of choice of forum/choice of law provision to
address situations where its arbitration provision does not apply. See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, supra note 320; see also supra note 320 and accompanying text
(discussing the relevant arbitration agreement).
340. The place where a business entity is organized often acts as an implicit choice of forum
provision. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 338, at 1476; Grundfest, supra note 332, at 350–
51.
341. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2006).
342. See Wilson, supra note 284, at 888, 890. For an interesting analysis of whether and to
what extent substantive legal issues should be decided in the “home” forum of the relevant legal
principle, see Verity Winship, Aligning Law and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN.
L. REV. 1 (2013).
343. See Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
219, 220–21 (2013); Wilson, supra note 284, at 890–91.
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Indeed, the desire to ensure proper application of choice of law provisions
is one of the reasons why parties adopt arbitration rather than litigation in
complex multijurisdictional actions.344
Although choice of forum and choice of law provisions may initially
appear to be less problematic than arbitration,345 these types of
mechanisms experience a number of the same difficulties that are seen in
arbitration. For example, choice of forum and choice of law provisions
may trigger public policy concerns about having a nationally or
regionally important dispute decided by someone other than a U.S. state
or federal judge.346 As the recent financial crisis shows, transparency and
accountability are critical to the proper protection of individuals and
institutions,347 and policymakers may be loath to allow various types of
public concerns to be heard outside the relevant jurisdiction. The
international legal and business communities have also enunciated
concerns about whether and to what extent offshore trusts are being used
to conceal assets from judgment or award creditors.348
These concerns could lead judiciaries or legislatures to refuse to
enforce certain types of forum selection provisions.349 They also support
the argument that these types of matters should be heard in federal rather
than state court. Furthermore, some facially acceptable solutions—such

344. Arbitrators tend to comply with choice of law provisions more readily than judges and
are often chosen for their expertise in that law. Cf. Stefan Michael Kröll, The “Arbitrability” of
Disputes Arising from Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ¶ 16-57, at 339, ¶ 16-65, at 342 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L.
Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
345. See supra notes 323–26 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC policy on
arbitration).
346. See Verdier, supra note 281, at 119–20, 146 (noting problems associated with regulation
of transnational disputes).
347. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES xix, xxii (2011), http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/201103
10173538/http://www.fcic.gov/report; Arthur, supra note 141, at 590.
348. Tim Penny QC has stated: “Offshore trusts are frequently used. . . . They will often
engage bona fide trustees, a bona fide offshore structure with a bona fide trust and arrange matters
so that they have the power to tell the trustees what to do.” BURFORD BAROMETER, 2016 JUDGMENT
ENFORCEMENT SURVEY 4 (2016), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
06/Burford_WhitePaper_US_Final_Web.pdf (conducting an empirical study regarding the
enforcement rates of court judgments and arbitral awards and noting that many judgments and
awards are not complied with at their full value); see also id. (“Some of the most bedeviling
enforcement challenges comes [sic] in cases in which a judgment debtor . . . has taken significant
steps to conceal assets by moving them into offshore jurisdictions, where they are hard to identify,
let alone recover.”).
349. See O’Hara, supra note 333, at 309.
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as the use of a foreign location as the trust’s place of registration—may
not resolve all of the problems created by Americold.350
The prospect of exit through organization in a foreign country may be
particularly troubling to Congress, since the flight to offshore
jurisdictions could have a significant financial effect on local and national
economies. Trust law is a very lucrative and competitive field, and
commentators have already noted “strong evidence of a national market
for trust funds that is responsive to the interplay between state trust law
and federal tax law.”351 Specialists have already voiced concerns about
losing transactional and dispute-related business to other jurisdictions,
leading state legislatures to become increasingly responsive to the
concerns of the trust law industry.352 International and interstate
competition also gives rise to regulatory concerns, given the potential for
a race to the bottom.353
3. Exit Through Choice of Business Form
Perhaps the most effective way for parties to avoid the effects of
Americold is by choosing to operate as a corporation rather than a
commercial trust. Numerous studies exist describing how various
differences between trusts and corporations can affect the decision to use
one business form over another,354 and it appears likely that questions
relating to diversity jurisdiction will soon be factored into these types of
350. For example, establishing a commercial trust in a foreign country does not ensure a
federal forum if suit is brought in the United States. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying
text.
351. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 362; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1037–38, 1055–
56 (2000) (noting competition among the states for trust business); Eisenberg & Miller, supra
note 338, at 1481 (noting competition for legal business outside the trust context).
352. Trust lawyers and commercial lawyers have both enunciated significant concerns about
the prospects of losing business to jurisdictions with more welcoming laws, and anecdotal
information suggests that practitioners are actively lobbying for legislation that facilitates
commercial trusts in their jurisdictions so as to remain competitive. See Horton, supra note 9, at
1070; Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing regulatory competition in corporate, securities,
bankruptcy, environmental, tax, secured transactions, welfare, and antitrust law); Sitkoff &
Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 359–64.
353. See Sterk, supra note 351, at 1037–38, 1055–57.
354. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency,
28 J. CORP. L. 565, 570–81 (2003) (comparing trusts and publicly-traded corporations to
determine the effect of capital market efficiency); A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus
Corporations: An Empirical Analysis of Competing Organizational Forms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183,
184–87, 219–20 (2010) (focusing on issues involving regulation of trusts and corporations,
particularly with respect to agency conflict and decisional flexibility). Empirical studies also exist
with respect to competition between different states for particular types of trust-related business.
See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 109, at 362.
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strategic analyses. While some people may not believe that a Supreme
Court decision about diversity jurisdiction will have a significant effect
on commercial decision-making, recent research by Professors Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein demonstrates how even small “nudges” can
influence individual and institutional behavior.355 The question therefore
is whether Congress wishes to increase the incentives in favor of the
corporate form by allowing Americold to stand.
IV. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO AMERICOLD
As important as the Supreme Court is in deciding matters relating to
diversity jurisdiction, the Court does not have the final word on this
issue.356 In fact, the Court itself suggested in Americold that Congress
could and should intervene if it believes commercial trusts should be
given increased access to federal courts.357
At this point, Congress appears to have two possible responses to
Americold. First, Congress could create a statutory exception to the rule
requiring complete diversity, something it has done on three previous
occasions.358 Second, Congress could create a statutory definition of the
citizenship of a business trust, similar to that used for corporations in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).359 Both approaches seem viable, although they
would lead to slightly different results.
A. Creation of a Statutory Exception to the Rule Requiring
Complete Diversity
The first way that Congress could override Americold is through a
statutory exception to the rule requiring complete diversity.360 This
approach would likely be relatively easy to implement, which is
important given the wide range of commercial trusts in existence and the
potential difficulty in providing a single definition for citizenship that
encompasses all of the types of commercial trusts that are currently
possible.361 This type of response would also pass constitutional muster,
since the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he complete diversity
requirement is not mandated by the Constitution.”362
355. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 252 (2008).
356. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1317, 1382.
357. See Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016).
358. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605, at 223.
359. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
360. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
361. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing types of commercial trusts).
362. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005) (citing State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967)).
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Congress has adopted a rule of minimal diversity in three different
statutes:363 the Interpleader Act;364 the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act (known as the MMTJA or the mass-disaster act);365 and
CAFA.366 Each of these enactments differs slightly in both form and
intent. For example, the Interpleader Act was enacted in 1936 in response
to the Supreme Court decision in New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunlevy367 and authorized national service of process in federal
interpleader actions involving claimants who came from different
states.368
The Interpleader Act stood as a jurisdictional anomaly until 2002,
when the MMTJA was adopted to address injuries arising out of a single
mass disaster.369 The MMTJA acts by conferring original jurisdiction on
the federal courts in any civil case involving minimal
diversity between adverse parties and involving a single
accident at a discrete location where at least seventy-five
persons died and either (a) the accident occurred in a state or
other location different from that of defendant’s residence,
(b) “any two defendants reside in different States,” or (c)
“substantial parts of the accident took place in different
States.”370
CAFA, the third and thus far final statute in this series, was enacted in
2005 to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution
by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction.”371 CAFA did so by giving
federal courts jurisdiction over any class action with minimal diversity
363. Minimal diversity means that at least one plaintiff and one defendant are diverse, as
opposed to complete diversity, which requires all plaintiffs and defendants to be diverse.
364. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(2012)); see also State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 (noting “in a variety of contexts this Court and the
lower courts have concluded that Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of
federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens”);
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 308, at 549 (noting the Interpleader Act is and was largely
uncontroversial).
365. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1826 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1369 (2012)); see also Floyd, supra note 244, at 624–28.
366. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453 (2012); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 3605, at 229; Wood, supra note 17, at 602–03.
367. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
368. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 308, at 549 n.42.
369. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a), (c)(4).
370. Miller, supra note 244, at 296 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(2), (3)). Congress also
altered the removal statute to expand the jurisdiction of the courts in these types of matters. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (2012); Miller, supra note 244, at 296.
371. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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among the adverse parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $5
million.372
Closer examination shows some key similarities between these
various enactments, particularly the two most recent. For example, each
of these statutes provides federal jurisdiction over matters primarily or
exclusively governed by state law but addressing issues of national
importance.373 This rationale appears to apply equally to commercial
trusts, since they are also largely governed by state law despite their
national, if not international, significance.374
Another similarity involves the nature of the relevant disputes. All
three statutes address questions of particular complexity that can and
often do arise on a multijurisdictional basis.375 Notably, commercial
trusts also involve disputes involving complicated cross-border
concerns.376
The final analogy to consider involves the number of parties and the
types of claims asserted. Both the MMTJA and CAFA were designed to
deal with large-scale disputes (i.e., class and mass actions) that cross
jurisdictional lines.377 Not only can the number of plaintiffs be relatively
large, but the disputes involve claims that are identical or substantially
similar in nature. Allowing access to federal courts encourages resolution
of the matter at a single time, in a single forum, and avoids inequitable
and inefficient fragmentation of the litigation process. Notably, these
elements are also present in disputes involving commercial trusts. Not
only can internal trust disputes involve hundreds if not hundreds of
thousands of parties spread across the nation, but most of the parties are
similarly if not identically situated.378 Indeed, internal trust disputes often

372. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). CAFA also includes a provision allowing a “mass
action” of over 100 plaintiffs to be removed to federal court if the $5 million minimum is also
met. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(A)–(B)(i).
373. See Wood, supra note 17, at 604–05.
374. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. Notably, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) seeks to
achieve a similar goal, although it does so through different means (i.e., by deeming corporations
to be citizens of the state in which they are incorporated and the state which constitutes their
principal place of business).
375. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3605.
376. See supra notes 26, 72, 137, 155, 161 and accompanying text. It is also easy to see how
disputes involving commercial trusts resemble those involving corporations, although 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1) addresses federal jurisdiction in a different manner. See supra note 374.
377. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1369, 1453 (2012).
378. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (noting that trusts can have thousands of geographically
diverse participants). Notably, the size and character of commercial trust disputes resemble that
of corporate disputes, suggesting that commercial trusts should be considered akin to corporations
for jurisdictional purposes. See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 607 (2012) (discussing concept of “bigness in business”).
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demonstrate more consistency in terms of the parties’ claims and defenses
than actions under the MMTJA and CAFA.379
Together, these factors suggest that Congress should strongly consider
adopting a statute that would allow commercial trust disputes to proceed
in federal court if only minimal diversity exists. When drafting this
statute, it may be necessary for Congress to include other requirements,
similar to those used in the Interpleader Act, MMTJA, and CAFA, so as
to make sure that the new regime is not overly inclusive. Thus, it might
be reasonable to include a statutory minimum regarding either the number
of parties or the amount in dispute, as is the case with both the MMTJA
and CAFA.380 If this approach is adopted, Congress should also consider
amending the federal removal statute to reflect the rationales contained
in the new statute.381
B. Creation of a Statutory Definition of Citizenship Similar to
That of Corporations
The second option available to Congress involves a statute putting
commercial trusts on equal footing with corporations by deeming
commercial trusts to be citizens of one or perhaps two easily identified
jurisdictions.382 This proposal can be justified on the basis of the
theoretical and functional similarity between commercial trusts and
corporations,383 although additional support can be found in the types of
rationales used to justify a statute allowing for minimal diversity.384
This proposal can also be rationalized by reference to the reasons for
adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).385 To fully appreciate the nature of the
statute, it is necessary to go back to the mid-nineteenth century,386 when
379. Although parties to a dispute involving a commercial trust could be aligned on two
separate sides (as would be the case in a dispute involving the propriety of a particular business
decision), the litigation strategies would be essentially binary. See Strong, supra note 317, at 641.
Indeed, internal trust disputes have often been described as proceeding in rem and thus would be
more cohesive than some matters proceeding under the MMTJA or CAFA, which could require
various subclasses to take into account different types of injuries or different applicable laws. See
Strong, supra note 317, at 594, 637.
380. For example, the CAFA removal statute requires a minimum of 100 litigants, while the
MMTJA requires seventy-five injured persons. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11), 1369(a) (2012).
CAFA also requires the amount in dispute to be in excess of $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
381. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
382. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
383. See supra Part II.
384. Thus, the fact that commercial trusts give rise to what are often large-scale disputes of
national significance and particular complexity even though they are governed by state law could
be used to extend the rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to commercial trusts. See supra Part III.
385. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
386. An earlier decision held that corporations could be considered citizens, but looked
through the corporate entity to individual shareholders to determine citizenship for purposes of
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the Supreme Court first addressed the citizenship of corporations in
Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Railroad v. Letson387 and Marshall
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.388 These decisions sought to preserve the
“valuable privilege” of federal jurisdiction for corporations by creating a
conclusive presumption that corporations were citizens of their state of
incorporation.389 In both Marshall and Letson, the Court set aside the rule
requiring courts to look through the corporation to the shareholders as the
real parties in interest, thereby embracing the concept of “entity
citizenship” as opposed to “aggregate citizenship.”390 This approach was
justified because
[t]he right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege of
no small practical importance, and more especially in cases
where a distant plaintiff has to contend with the power and
influence of great numbers and the combined wealth wielded
by corporations in almost every State. It is of importance
also to corporations themselves that they should enjoy the
same privileges, in other States, where local prejudices or
jealousy might injuriously affect them.391
One of the reasons why the Supreme Court adopted this rule was
because “the members of a corporation are not individually liable for its
obligations at all.”392 As a result, “there can be no judgment against them
individually, nor against a part of them, the judgment must be against the
body corporate, which includes all the members.”393
The pre-existing case law on commercial citizenship was explicitly
incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) when the statute was adopted in
1958.394 Although some authorities have suggested the most important
aspect of that process was the way in which it sought to limit federal
jurisdiction through the insertion of language relating to a corporation’s
principal place of business, Congress nevertheless reiterated the

diversity jurisdiction. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 83 (1809),
overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554–56 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
387. 43 U.S. at 558.
388. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
389. Id. at 327–28.
390. Cohen, supra note 40, at 271–72.
391. Marshall, 57 U.S. at 329.
392. Letson, 43 U.S. at 503.
393. Id.
394. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
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importance of diversity jurisdiction for commercial entities in its
deliberations.395
Commercial trusts of course share numerous attributes with
corporations, including the notion that “there can be no judgment against
them individually, nor against a part of them.”396 As a result, it is logical
for Congress to respond to Americold by adopting a definition for
citizenship of commercial trusts similar to that used for corporations.397
Furthermore, there is nothing in either Letson398 or Marshall,399 or in
the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c),400 that suggests that either
the Supreme Court or Congress believes that diversity jurisdiction was
and is appropriate for incorporated entities but not for functionally
identical entities such as commercial trusts. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has recognized that its current approach to unincorporated
commercial entities, including commercial trusts, is entirely
“unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities of
business organization.”401
395. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 97 (2010) (noting that “a major reason for the
insertion of the ‘principal place of business’ language in the diversity statute” was to impede
“jurisdictional manipulation”); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3099, 3101–02; Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV.
213, 218–19 (1959). For example, the Senate report on the bill stated:
The underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship legislation (which incidentally
goes back to the beginning of the federal judicial system, having been established
by the Judiciary Act of 1789) is to provide a separate forum for out-of-state
citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making available
to them the benefits and safeguards of the federal courts. Whatever the
effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations
which, because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another state. It is a
matter of common knowledge that such incorporations are primarily initiated to
obtain some advantage taxwise in the state of incorporation or to obtain the
benefits of the more liberal provisions of the foreign state’s corporation laws.
Such incorporations are not intended for the prime purpose of doing business in
the foreign state. It appears neither fair nor proper for such a corporation to avoid
trial in the state where it has its principal place of business by resorting to a legal
device not available to the individual citizen.
S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4.
396. Letson, 43 U.S. at 503.
397. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1012, 1017 (2016); 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1:15 (3d ed. 2015).
398. See Letson, 43 U.S. at 497.
399. See Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 314 (1854), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4.
401. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
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When considering the proposed change, it is also necessary to
appreciate that the rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) cannot be justified on the
grounds that the corporation is the standard form of business
organization, since corporations do not in fact enjoy that status.402 As a
result, there is no policy-related reason why the rule in Americold should
prevail and indeed numerous reasons why it should not.
Should Congress decide to override Americold, it has several options.
One possibility would look for inspiration from the Kintner tax
Regulations, which were originally generated to determine whether an
unincorporated business association such as a commercial trust would be
taxed as a corporation or what was known as a “pass-through”
organization.403 Commentators seeking to build off these rules have
suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 should be amended to state:
(3) an entity other than a corporation that possesses at least
four of the following characteristics: (i) limited liability for
members; (ii) required filing of organizational documents by
a state; (iii) lack of free transferability of interest; (iv) lack
of centralized management; and (v) lack of continuity of life,
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State in which it has
filed organizational documents and of the State where it has
its principal place of business.404
This approach would create a workable rule for commercial trusts
while also avoiding excessive litigation by allowing similar treatment of
other sorts of unincorporated associations, including general
partnerships, fraternal societies, or associations.405 However, the Kintner
Regulations were unable to address the diversity and creativity associated
with commercial trusts, which ultimately led to the Regulations’
demise.406 As a result, this proposal must be considered with some
caution.
The better approach might be for Congress to focus on the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) itself, which states that:
a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State
and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of
the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business, except that in any direct action against the insurer
402. See Thomas E. Rutledge, Recent Developments in Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs and
Other Unincorporated Forms, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 57, 61.
403. See Christy, supra note 11, at 152; Oh, supra note 4, at 405–14.
404. Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity
Test for Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 121
(1995); see also Christy, supra note 11, at 152 (proposing this test in the context of commercial
trusts).
405. See Tribeck, supra note 404, at 121–22.
406. See Oh, supra note 4, at 414.
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of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured
is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of—
(A) every State and foreign state of which the insured is a
citizen;
(B) every State and foreign state by which the insurer has
been incorporated; and
(C) the State or foreign state where the insurer has its
principal place of business.407
According to this model, Congress needs to consider three separate
elements: the place where the commercial trust is formed, the trust’s
principal place of business, and any special rules on insurance. 408 Each
element must of course be adapted to the needs of the commercial trust
community.
The first item to consider is the place that is analogous to a
corporation’s place of incorporation. Here, Congress has several options.
First, Congress could codify the rule in Navarro so as to equate the
citizenship of a commercial trust with the place(s) where the trustees
reside.409 This approach has some merit, since trustees are an ineluctable
part of every trust.410 However, some commentators have opposed this
option on the grounds that not all business trusts require legal title to be
vested in the trustees.411 Furthermore, commercial trusts can have an
unlimited number of trustees, which could make this rule unwieldy and
expand the number of jurisdictions in which a commercial trust is
considered a citizen to more than two, which is the current limit under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), at least in cases not involving insurance.412
A better alternative may be to indicate that commercial trusts are
deemed to be citizens of the state in which they are formed. This approach
407. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
408. See id. The ABA has suggested similar amendments. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra
note 41, at 15.
409. See Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 465–66 (1980).
410. See Mecklenburg Cty. v. Time Warner Entm’t—Advance/Newhouse P’ship, No.
3:05cv333, 2010 WL 391279, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2010). While this rule could lead to some
forum shopping (for example, by having all corporate trustees reside in a jurisdiction that was
friendly to commercial trusts), that outcome seems preferable to eliminating the possibility of
federal jurisdiction altogether, as Americold requires. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016–17 (2016); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth
of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 681–84 (2002) (discussing and
criticizing conventional scholarship regarding forum shopping in the corporate context).
411. See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 12, at 107–09.
412. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
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would parallel the law of corporate citizenship and could easily be
applied in cases such as Americold, which involved a REIT structured
under a Maryland statute.413 This rule would also reflect the common
perception that “commercial trusts and corporations can be thought of as
mirror-image entities that respond to different investor needs.”414
This rule would be particularly easy to apply in cases where a
commercial trust is created by statute. However, not all commercial trusts
are statutory in nature.415 Instead, some commercial trusts are created by
agreement pursuant to the same longstanding rules that govern noncommercial trusts.416 In these cases, it may be difficult to establish the
same type of connection to a particular state that exists in cases involving
statutory business trusts. Therefore, Congress may wish to consider
adding a proviso indicating that non-statutory commercial trusts are
deemed to be citizens of the state whose law governs that trust. In most
cases, the trust instrument should explicitly identify the applicable law.417
However, even if the settlor does not include a choice of law provision in
the trust instrument, the relevant law can be determined through a
standard conflict of laws analysis.418
The second element that Congress might include in a new statute on
commercial trusts involves the trust’s principal place of business.
Congress, courts, and commentators have noted the importance of dual
citizenship to avoid “jurisdictional manipulation” by corporations,419
which suggests the need to establish a similar type of secondary
citizenship for commercial trusts. There are several possible ways to deal
with this element. First, Congress could duplicate the existing rule for
corporations and indicate that a trust should be considered a citizen of the
state where it maintains its principal place of business.420 This approach
has the benefit of simplicity, since it tracks the current approach to
corporate citizenship.421 Furthermore, most states require unincorporated
413. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-101(c), 8-102 (West 2016); Americold,
136 S. Ct. at 1015.
414. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 561.
415. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 32–33.
416. See KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247.
417. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 6; In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos
Trs., 59 A.3d 471, 478–79 (Del. Ch. 2012).
418. See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 81, art. 7; Wilson, supra note 284, at 890.
419. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 97 (2010) (noting that “a major reason for the
insertion of the ‘principal place of business’ language in the diversity statute” was to impede
“jurisdictional manipulation”); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3099, 3101–02; 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3624; Caitlin Sawyer, Note, Don’t Dissolve
the “Nerve Center”: A Status-Linked Citizenship Test for Principal Place of Business, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 641, 646–47 (2014).
420. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
421. See Oh, supra note 4, at 461, 471–73.
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business associations, including commercial trusts, to file some sort of
statement regarding their business conduct within the state, which would
assist with the task of identifying which state was the trust’s primary
place of business.422 Thus, the transaction costs associated with this
approach are relatively low.423
Adopting this approach would likely involve incorporation of the
Supreme Court’s “nerve center” test, as enunciated in Hertz Corp. v.
Friend.424 Although a number of commentators have praised the
decision,425 other observers have noted that the nerve center test
experiences certain problems as a result of “[t]he variety of corporate
structures and activities” that currently exist in U.S. law and practice.426
Commercial trusts are equally or perhaps even more diverse in terms of
their business structures and purposes, which may make it difficult to
apply the nerve center test when seeking to determine these entities’
primary places of business.427 Additional problems may arise if a
commercial trust operates primarily over the Internet rather than in a
single physical location or if the trust has been dissolved.428 While
corporations also must struggle with these issues, Congress should be
aware of these types of concerns when reforming the law relating to the
citizenship of commercial trusts.429
Alternatively, Congress might wish to track recent developments
regarding the “at home” standard enunciated by federal courts in the
context of personal jurisdiction.430 This possibility reflects certain
422. See id. at 469. Foreign trusts must file similar paperwork to obtain certain benefits. See
UNIFORM STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT §§ 102, 901–02, 905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009); cf. id.
§ 301 (noting parallels between domestic and qualified foreign trusts).
423. See Oh, supra note 4, at 471–73.
424. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 89–91.
425. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–11
(2011) (expressing some skepticism); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases: Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 124 HARV. L. REV. 309, 315 (2010) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
426. Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652; see also Leading Cases, supra note 425, at 319 (noting
difficulties in judicial administration).
427. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
428. See Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652–53 (discussing problems of dissolved and inactive
corporations). Although trust law disapproves of passive trusts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 6(3) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2001), the definition of a commercial trust “does not require
that the business be of an active or extensive nature.” KOVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 247. Indeed,
commercial trusts are often seen as “static entities with passive managers” as compared to the
aggressive and opportunistic approach employed by corporate managers. Schwarcz, supra note
26, at 328.
429. See Chaplin, supra note 40, at 98–99; Sawyer, supra note 419, at 652–53.
430. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919, 924 (2011); Niesel, supra note 2, at 837 (noting that recent case law from the
Supreme Court requires courts to consider three separate factors in matters involving corporate
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language in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown431 that
characterizes the place of incorporation and principal place of business
of a corporation as “paradigm” forums where general personal
jurisdiction exists.432 Commentators discussing general jurisdiction have
questioned whether this reference should be taken to reflect a link
between the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction and the
common law requirements for personal jurisdiction,433 and it may be
useful to consider whether the reverse is true (i.e., whether the law
regarding personal jurisdiction should influence the law of diversity
jurisdiction). In some ways, increasing the links between subject matter
and personal jurisdiction could be seen as beneficial, since it might
increase jurisdictional clarity.434 However, commentators have identified
several problems arising out of the nebulous nature of the “at home”
requirement, which suggests that Congress might do well to avoid this
standard when creating a new statute regarding the citizenship of
commercial trusts.435
The third and final issue that Congress must consider is whether to
incorporate a special rule regarding commercial trusts involved in the
insurance business. Trusts are relatively common in the insurance
industry, either as a means of complying with various U.S. regulations
regarding foreign insurers436 or as a means of spreading the risk of loss
amongst various underwriters.437 The situation regarding insuranceentities: the state of incorporation, the location of the principal place of business, and any unique
factors that can be used to demonstrate where the corporation is essentially “at home”). The
Supreme Court has also recently addressed specific jurisdiction, though to less criticism. See
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Parry, supra note 2, at 619–23.
431. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
432. See id. at 924 (describing general jurisdiction for a corporation as the place “in which
the corporation is fairly regarded as at home” and citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988), as describing domicile, place of
incorporation, and principal place of business as “paradig[m]” bases for general jurisdiction);
Niesel, supra note 2, at 859.
433. See Niesel, supra note 2, at 859–60 (citing authorities).
434. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (noting that “[s]imple jurisdictional
rules . . . promote greater predictability”); Dodson, supra note 425, at 4–5, 23–24 (identifying
difficulties in achieving jurisdictional clarity).
435. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 105–07 (suggesting that although Daimler
may result in “a level of certainty and predictability for which some commentators have longed,”
it has done so at a cost); Niesel, supra note 2, at 870–74. But see id. at 874 (discussing how to
simplify the “at home” analysis).
436. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 176.
437. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 796 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Upon
acceptance into the Society of Lloyd’s, the individual executes a number of documents, among
which are the premium trust deed, a member’s agent agreement, and a managing agent
agreement.”); Ian Kelley, Note, Regulatory Crisis at Lloyd’s of London: Reform from Within, 18
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1924, 1932 (1995).
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related trusts is complicated by the fact that U.S. courts are split on the
legal status of Lloyd’s, the largest insurance market in the world,438
including questions on how Lloyd’s is to be treated for diversity
purposes.439 Although a full analysis of Lloyd’s is beyond the scope of
the current Article, a significant amount of the business conducted by
Lloyd’s involves trusts.440
As complicated as insurance-related disputes may be, many of the
problems arise from the exclusion of commercial trusts and similarly
unincorporated entities from 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Creating a new
statutory rule to address commercial trusts should eliminate a number of
these concerns, particularly if the statute is drafted in such a manner as to
deal with the Lloyd’s problem.
In terms of language, the best solution would likely be to simply adopt
the insurance-related terminology used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).441 Not
only is this solution simple as a matter of legislative drafting, it also does
not jeopardize the possibility of diversity jurisdiction, since the addition
of the citizenship of the insured party to the calculus means that there are
only a limited number of states that need to be added to the jurisdictional
calculus. This is a much better outcome than that which currently applies
in most cases involving Lloyd’s, where the citizenship of all of the
underwriters (which can run in the tens of thousands) must be
considered.442

438. What Is Lloyd’s, LLOYDS, https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds (last visited June 30, 2017)
(describing the function of Lloyd’s); see Terri K. Benton, Where Do I Fit in? Citizenship Claims
and the § 1332 Diversity Statute in Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 79 DEF. COUNS.
J. 67, 69 (2012); Strong, supra note 161, at 305.
439. Three circuits require complete diversity of all underwriters. See Underwriters at
Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1084, 1088 –89 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring Lloyd’s
to plead the citizenship of all of its underwriters, which included over 400 syndicates and 30,000
members, when establishing diversity jurisdiction); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas.
Ins., 160 F.3d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1998); Ind. Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir.
1998). One circuit does not. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39,
42–44 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying the “real party to the controversy” test). Other courts have also
weighed in on the subject. See Howard M. Tollin & Mark Deckman, Lloyd’s of London and the
Problem with Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289, 293–99 (2000).
440. See Lloyd’s Trust Deeds, LLOYD’S, https://www.lloyds.com/the-market/operating-atlloyds/regulation/lloyds-trust-deeds (last visited June 30, 2017) (including various Lloyd’s trust
deeds, including several U.S. trust deeds, such as the Lloyd’s American Trust Fund (LATF), held
in New York and involving premiums and other receipts relating to general business denominated
in U.S. dollars, as well as various trust deeds involving business in Kentucky and Illinois and in
other countries).
441. See id.
442. See Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1084 (involving underwriters that included over 400
syndicates and 30,000 members).
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CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Americold Realty Trust
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. is in many ways consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the opinion will create significant problems if it is allowed
to stand.443 Not only will the decision severely restrict parties’ ability to
have commercial trust disputes heard in federal courts, it will also cause
a potentially significant number of commercial actors to either exit the
U.S. judicial system through the use of an arbitration agreement, choice
of court clause, or choice of law provision, or through a decision to
organize as a commercial trust in a foreign jurisdiction. Americold will
also act as a “nudge” in favor of the corporate form, which could lead to
significant but as of yet unknown ramifications.444
Over the years, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
consider the citizenship of unincorporated business associations and has
declined to treat those entities as analogous to corporations, claiming that
such measures fall within the province of the legislature.445 None of those
previous cases inspired a congressional override, despite the nearuniversal support of both the academic and practitioner communities for
reform in this field.446 However, this Article has shown that legislative
action is now necessary, given both the nature and the quantum of
problems created by Americold.
Unlike some of the other types of unincorporated business
associations that the Supreme Court has considered in the past,
commercial trusts are a ubiquitous part of the American legal landscape,
reaching across numerous industries that routinely operate on an
interstate or international basis.447 Commercial trusts are regularly used
in fields laden with public policy concerns and control trillions of dollars’
worth of assets, thereby affecting the economic and social interests of
both individuals and institutions.448 Requiring these types of disputes to
443. 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
444. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 355, at 8.
445. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 306
(2006) (determining the citizenship of a federally chartered national bank for diversity purposes);
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 568–69 (2004) (considering whether a
post-filing change in citizenship and status of both limited and general partners’ citizenship should
be considered in determining a partnership’s citizenship in a diversity case); Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (reaffirming the rule that the citizenship of all members of
a partnership must be considered in determining whether complete diversity exists).
446. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra note 41, at 15 (suggesting all unincorporated entities
be treated the same way as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Chaplin, supra
note 40, at 98–99; Cohen, supra note 40, at 275; Kleinberger, supra note 40, at 829; Matheson &
Olson, supra note 40, at 3.
447. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
448. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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be heard in state rather than federal court would not only be ill-advised
as a practical matter, it would make little sense in theoretical terms, given
that commercial trusts have long been recognized as “mirror image”
equivalents of corporations, a type of business association that has been
given special jurisdictional status by both Congress and the Court for over
150 years.449
The effects of Americold have already been felt and will only increase
in the coming months and years.450 However, the Court does not have the
final word on this issue. Instead, as the Justices themselves recognized,
Congress is empowered to craft a statutory solution to cure the problems
created by this decision.451
Two possibilities have been explored here. First, Congress could enact
legislation allowing commercial trusts to be heard in federal court
pursuant to minimal rather than complete diversity, as is the case under
the Interpleader Act, the MMTJA, and CAFA.452 Second, Congress could
adopt a statute, similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), identifying a discrete
number of jurisdictions where a commercial trust can be considered a
citizen.453 Both of these alternatives are feasible. However, the latter
option appears superior for several reasons.
Under the minimal diversity approach, plaintiffs will have more
control in choosing the venue. This technique appears appropriate in
cases involving mass disasters and class actions, because those situations
involve large numbers of injured individuals, many of them blameless,
unsophisticated, or both, who deserve some degree of autonomy in
choosing the place of litigation, either for the sake of convenience or
equity. It is therefore appropriate for the underlying legislation (i.e., the
MMTJA and CAFA) to create a rule that provides for a federal forum but
that does not mandate a particular place where the dispute should be
heard.454
Although the types of disputes that arise in cases involving minimal
diversity may be procedurally complex, many of them will be governed
by tort or contract law. While judges are occasionally faced with difficult
conflict of laws concerns, problems arise less often in practice than in
449. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928) (noting functional equivalence of the
two business forms); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854),
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R.
v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
450. See RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2016)
(involving a pension trust); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcont’l Realty Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3:14cv-3565-BN, 2016 WL 3570648, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2016) (involving a securitization trust).
451. See Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016).
452. See supra notes 364–81 and accompanying text.
453. See supra Section IV.B.
454. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1369, 1453.
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theory.455 Furthermore, the basic principles of tort and contract law are
relatively similar across the country, despite variation in certain details.456
As a result, an incorrect determination of the conflict of laws analyses
will likely not affect the outcome of the dispute and therefore will not
offend the public policy of the state whose law ought to have been
applied.
Litigation involving commercial trusts reflects a number of qualities
that are in many ways analogous to litigation involving corporations. For
example, corporations and commercial trusts both have a high need for
predictability, and a statutory model that establishes the citizenship of a
commercial trust will increase predictability in a number of ways. For
instance, adopting a commercial trust statute that is modeled on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) would likely eliminate the distinction between Rules 17(b)(2)
and 17(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the law
applicable to the question of whether a particular business organization
has the ability to sue in its own name and therefore rationalize the venue
selection analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.457 Increased predictability in
terms of the location of suit will also help overcome concerns about the
proper and consistent application of substantive law, both in terms of the
anticipated outcome of the dispute as well as respect for the public policy
of the state whose law governs the matter in question.
This issue is particularly important given that the vast majority of
litigation involving commercial trusts involves internal disputes
regarding the operation and governance of the trust.458 Not only do these
types of suits involve complex questions of law, they also involve matters
that are intimately connected with public policy. As a result, it is in the
interest of the trust, the parties (including the shareholder-beneficiaries),
the state(s), and the nation to have these issues resolved in a consistent
and predictable manner. All of these rationales are similar to those
involving corporate litigation. As a result, it seems better to adopt a rule
that puts commercial trust litigation on par with corporate litigation
through the definition of citizenship rather than a rule that simply
provides commercial trust disputes with increased access to federal courts
455. See Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the
Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923, 1924–25.
456. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1, 36 (2015); Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation,
1 J. TORT L. 6, 38–40 (2007).
457. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2012) (stating “an entity with the capacity to sue and be
sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(b); supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (regarding Rule 17).
458. See Hwang, supra note 87, at 83.
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by allowing such suits to rely on minimal rather than complete diversity.
Indeed, in 2015, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution
supporting just such an approach.459
As Judge Diane Wood has recognized, Congress has acted in the past
to bring “the federal courts back into the business of adjudicating matters
of national importance where no federal law prescribes the rule of
decision.”460 While Congress must be cautious,461 jurisdictional reform
regarding commercial trusts can and should be completed without
unnecessary delay so as to protect U.S. institutions and individuals, as
well as the U.S. economy, from significant and potentially long-lasting
harm. Indeed, as Chief Justice (formerly President) William Howard Taft
once said:
No single element—and I want to emphasize this . . . —no
single element in our governmental system has done so
much to secure capital for the legitimate development of
enterprises . . . as the existence of federal courts . . . with a
jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases.462
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, interstate and
international disputes involving commercial trusts should be heard in
federal district court as a matter of both policy and prudence. Congress
should therefore take the appropriate steps to override the Supreme Court
decision in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Ltd. and allow
parties to rely on diversity jurisdiction in cases involving commercial
trusts.

459. See ABA Resolution 103B, supra note 41, at 6, 15 (suggesting all unincorporated
entities be treated the same way as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
460. Wood, supra note 17, at 604; see also Miller, supra note 244, at 271; James M.
Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 222 (2006)
(“Congress has . . . embarked on a very different path, apparently intent upon pulling diversity
out of the academic and judicial doghouse and more fully exercising its Article III power to open
the doors to the federal courts. Such conduct is constitutional and likely to lead to dramatic
changes in the way important interstate disputes are resolved. It is time for the legal community
to wake up to these changes.”).
461. Designing a clear jurisdictional approach is deceptively difficult. See Dodson, supra
note 425, at 23–24.
462. Taft, supra note 4, at 604.
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